Department of Operations Research and Administrative Sciences Management Quarterly / March 77 by Parker, J.R. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Institutional Publications Department of Administrative Sciences Management Quarterly (1969-1982)
1977-03
Department of Operations Research and
Administrative Sciences Management
Quarterly / March 77
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/61462
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
• 
i 
j . MANAGEMENT OUARlERlY 








(Prepared at the Naval Postraduate School. Issuance of 
this periodical. approved in accordance with Department of 
the Navy Publication and Printing Regulations P-J5.) 
TABIE OF CON'IENTS •• , , , ••• , , • , • • , • 1 , • , , , • , • , , , • , , •• , • , • , 1 
EDI'IORIA.L • ••••••••• , •••••• , •• , • ••• , ••••••••••••• , • • • • • • 11 
SOME CON'IEMPORARY IDEAS ON THE 
SIBA'IEGIC ISSt.IE ••••••••••• , •• • •• , •••••••••••••••••••••• l 
By Lieutenant Commander David J. Nash, CEC, USN 
ALBANIA: THE EAS'IERN EUROPEAN ENIGMA, ••• ,., ••• , •• , •••• 18 
By Captain David L. Helms, USAF 
360-SKia THE SOVIET COMPU'IER INDUS'fflY,.,, , ••••• , , , , , , , 37 
By Lieutenant Commander Jeffrey T, Ackerson, USN 
DECISION-MAKING IN THE NAVAL OFFICER 
DISTRIBUTION PROCESS, •••••••••••••••••••• ,,, ••••• , ••••• 49 





In continuation of a s t udent project init i ated in the last quarter 
of academic year 1968-1969, the editorial staff of the Management Quarterly 
is pleased to present to 1 ts readers four course work papers written by 
students at the Naval Postgraduate School. The papers were selected for 
their excellence in terms of broad-based appeal , readability, and informa-
tive value. 
Succeeding editorial. sta.:rfs will continue to consider for publication O 
all student papers submitted from every education and resea.rch department 
of the Naval Postgraduate School. It is the editors' opinion that a con-
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fit the readers by providing a broad spectrum of interestine; topics within 
or related to the general field of military management and/or operations. 
In order to ensure a continuous input of student papers to the editor- -· 
ial staff, a Student Mail Center box (SK: 1499) has been designated for 
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students the unique opportunity to have their research efforts recognized, 
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of the work involved . 
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Buttinger, Professor J. Valenta, and Commander c. Gibf'ried for the time 
devoted to reviewing the papers which are published in this issue. Our 
appreciation is extended in acknowledgement of the guidance provided by 
our advisor, Lieutenant Commander R. Sagehorn a.s well as the valuable 
assistance of the staff of the Adminisi:3:'&tive Science Curricular Off'ice. O 
The views expressed in the Management Quarterly are those of the 
authors exclusively, and in no way reflect the attitude or endorsement 
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$0ME CONTE MPot,tY IDEA$ [ . 
. iON THE $TRATEG/t /$$1/E 
by 
-
David J. Nas~ 
Stra.tegic policy bas been the subject of continuing 
debate over the years, particularly the recent con-
cern over US-USSR strategic balance. The author 
reviews an article written by Paul Nitze, former 
Secretary of the Navy, concerning -µie assurance of 
at.Tategic atabili ty in an age of de ten te. The 
author then contrasts Nitze's views with the views 
expressed in articles written in rebuttal by Jan 
Lodal and members of the Control and Disarmament 
Program at S tanf'ord Uni verai ty. 
The paper·commencea with a general overview of the 
situation followed by a short discussion of the 
history of Soviet-American relations. Next strate~ 
nuclear concepts are discussed, including historical 
Soviet and American policies concerning these concepts. 
The SALT talks are briefly reviewed followed by the 
change in views of nuclear strategy problens which 
leads into Nitze's view of what would happen 1n the 
event of a nuclear exchange. The paper concludes 
nth a discussion of Nitze'a recommendations as to 
future US action. 
'lbia paper was submitted to Lieutenant Commander J. 
Buttinger 1n partial fulfillment of the course 
requirements for Public Policy Processes (lifi )172). 
The Editors 
Lieutenant C0J1Ja&11der David J. Nash, CEC I USN, received 
his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the Indiana 
Institute of Technology in 1965. He is presently a 
candidate for an M.S. 1n Financial Management at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss a January 1976 
article by Mr. Paul Nitze (ref. 4) concerning the assurance 
of strategic stability in an age of detente. This article 
will be reviewed and compared to subsequent comments and 
rebuttals concerning Mr. Nitze's article. Hopefully, the 
reader will obtain an understanding of the major points of 
this article viewed in light of "expert" rebuttal that com-
mented on his original work. Part of the opposing views 
was taken from a rather lengthy 23 January 1976 letter (ref. 
6) to Senator Adlai E. Stevenson from four gentlemen con-
nected with the Control and Disarmament Program at Stanford 
University in Stanford, California. The second source of 0 
comments con to Mr. Nitze's ideas was an April article (ref. 
3) by Mr. Jan Lodal written for the Foreign Affairs magazine. 
A final source of information consulted was a reply (ref. 5) 
by Mr. Nitze to Mr. Lodal's criticism of the original article . 
The Nitze reply appeared in the July Foreign Affairs magazine, 
in the Comment and Correspondence section. 
Before embarking on the reading of this paper, one should 
be cautioned that the subject is very dynamic and very prone 
to bias in t he view of the reviewer. Further, it is a sizable 
undertaking to attempt such a vast and expert field in a short 
paper; however, it is hoped that this endeavor will stimulate 
thought and above all, focus on the difficulty of deciding 
what is right and who is correct in this important field of 
policy. 
Prior to commencing the detai l ed discussion of the various 
points of view, it seems important to reflect on some thoughts 
not directly connected to the articles to ·be discussed, but 
pertinent to the subject matter. First, t o the author, this 
article and its subsequent commentors illustrate one facet of 
how policy is made in a democratic society such as ours. That 
is, that policy and partic u larly foreign and strategic policy 0 
is a r ather evolutionary or iterative process that begins with 
ideas and evolves over time into policy. Next , the reader who 
is familiar with Inquiry Systems should reflect on first what 
methods or method each proponent uses to derive the facts and 
the solu t io n as they see it. Secondly, it is interesting to 
consider what part each of these articles or letters plays in 
the larger inquiry system used to come up with the eventual 
decision or decisions on over all policy. 
Another interesting tangential aspect of these articles 
is to consider the effect of the ttwhere you sit affects what .. 




important figure in many past administrations, is presently 
out but appears to be one of the leading proponents in the 
theory that the U.S. is falling behind in the arms race. On 
the other side is Mr. Lodal, who was reported to be a "ghost 
writer" for Secretary of State Kissinger. It is hard to dis-
pute that Mr. Kissinger was a major architect in foreign 
policy and strategic policy over the last several years. 
For those who favor Allison's treatise on the Cuban Missile 
Crisis (ref. 1), it is hard to miss the fact that the under-
lying theme in parts of the articles and letter under dis-
cussion is that the "other side" fits into the Rational Actor 
paradigm and represents a monolithic body of thought and action . 
That is, we expect him to react in certain ways based on his 
rational consideration of the alternatives and selection of 
the "most sensible" path of action. 
For the reader who is interested in delving deeper into 
this subject, a treatise on arms races in general (ref. 2) is 
recommended for background reading. This article gives a good 
grounding in the arms race phenomenon as well as interesting 
history on the subject. 
Finally, one thought brought out in the Stanford letter 
that Mr. Nitze and others may be overlooking, is that actions 
which elevate the ·nuclear arms race have a byproduct of irri-
tating a problem some say is worse - nuclear proliferation 
among third party countries. 
This paper will be structured around Mr. Nitze's article 
with areas of disagreement as expressed by the rebuttals ex-
plored concurrently where the original point occurs in the 
Nitze article . It is impossible and would be less than worth-
while to cover all of Mr. Nitze's points so discussion will be 
limited to the major subject areas. 
This paper will commence with a general overview of the 
situation followed by a short discussion of the history of 
Soviet-American relations . Next Strategic Nuclear Concepts 
will be discussed, including historical Soviet and American 
policies concerning these concepts. The SALT talks will then 
be briefly reviewed including the latest attempt, SALT II; 
followed by the change in views of nuclear strategy problems 
which will lead into Mr. Nitze's view of what would happen in 
the event of a nuclear exchange. The paper will be concluded 
with a discussion of Mr. Nitze's recommendations as to future 
U.S. action. 
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Mr. Nitze commences his article by setting the stage for 
his later discussion about what this country should be doing 
now in face of the continued Soviet buildup of strategic 
weapons. He contends, contrary to popular belief, that under 
the Vladivostok Agreement (SALT II) the Soviets will continue 
to build their strategic capability to a position of clear 
superiority or war winning ability. Further, he concludes 
that once this superiority is reached, the Soviets will modify 
their policies to such an extent as to destroy detente and 
will embark to further the Soviet cause. Mr. Nitze specifi-
cally says that he is not recommending abandonment of our 
efforts at negotiation for disarmament but does feel that the 0 
SALT II talks are not a good basis for future arms-limitation 
negotiations. Finally, a statement is made that the U.S. must 
take action now to dissuade the Soviets from their present 
tack concerning arms buildup. 
In Mr. Lodal's article, he concedes that the rate of 
Soviet buildup following SALT II talks is ttdisappointing~ and 
"suspicious''. However he contends that the Soviets consider 
some of our actions as likewise not consistent with a general 
relaxation of tension. These actions include continued U.S. 
presence overseas, U.S. interference in Soviet internal affairs 
and finally a lack of ttnormal" trade relations between the two 
countries. While Mr. Lodal agrees that things may not be going 
well, he does not share Mr. Nitze's opinion that the Soviets 
are close to nuclear superiority. 
The letter from the gentlemen at Stanford agrees that al-
though t h e Soviets are not showing self-restraint, they con-
sider that the U.S. likewise has not slowed its "strategic 
technology pace". They share Mr. Lodal's opinion that Soviet 
superiority is not near and cite a .. posture statement" made 
by Mr. Schlessinger in 1975 as their basis for such a belief. 
Based on this statement, these gentlemen feel that Soviet sup- O 
eriority is not possible in the next decade. 
These arguments and later points in all three treatises 
illustrate the dilema faced by analysts and decision makers in 
trying to assess who is ahead in the arms race and what to do 
about it, Further, it is my opinion based on Mr. Nitze's 
article and other items found in t h e daily news that the age 
of detente, as we have known in the past, is beginning to fade. 
It appears as though even those who held much hope for the 
c hange i n the natur e of Communism and Communists which would 
have made it more compatible with the other forms of Government 
found in the world, are now beginning to view with disdain the 




III. RECENT HISTORY OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
Mr. Nitze began by creating a backdrop for his ensuing 
thoughts by briefly exploring the history of Soviet and U.S. 
relations that brought us the age of detente and of disarma-
ment talks. One of the major causes of the change in world 
relationships was the Sino-Soviet split that occurred in the 
late sixties. When the Soviet divisions on the Chinese border 
grew from 15 in the mid sixties to 45 in 1972, the Chinese 
began to look for an ally. According to Mr. Nitze, this search 
brought on "Ping Pong" diplomacy of the Nixon years. The U.S. 
was the only power in the world that China could turn to that 
had the strategic nuclear capability to seriously threaten the 
Russians. The U.S. chose to be "even handed" at this juncture 
in history and remained neutral. This neutrality probably 
ushered in the age of detente. Whether this is true or not, 
the Russians certainly became more sociable during the early 
70's. · 
The year 1972 was a big year in the history of detente 
for during this year the SALT I agreement, the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement were entered into by 
the U.S. and the Soviets. Accompanying these agreements, the 
Soviets agreed to help insure implementation of the Paris 
Agreements concerning Southeast Asia. All of these agreements 
have failed to provide positive action by the Soviets which 
would have indicated that they are interested in really striving 
towards world peace. In fact, Mr. Nitze stated that the Soviets 
were very instrumental in assuring the fall of the Republic of 
South Vietnam in its final days. Due to this lack of demonstra-
tive action, coupled with what the Soviet leaders are saying to 
the Russian people today, serious doubts are being cast upon 
Communist intentions. 
Soviet writers quoted by Mr. Nitze say because of "nuclear 
parity" and aJtente the Communist world may now shift its atten-
tion away from the "colonial world" to the "developed world". 
Mr. Nitze draws the conclusion that to Communist leaders detente 
is analagous to the Cold War as we have known it . 
Mr. Lodal made no major comments about this portion of 
Mr. Nitze's article but the Stanford group was critical of 
Mr. Nitze's use of "Soviet propaganda" as a basis for deter-
mining the aims of Soviet leaders. The group contends that 
this notion is "simplistic" and that, in their opinion, no 
U.S. planning (military or political) to counteract Soviet 
capability has been based or will be based on what the Soviet 
writers~ is Soviet policy. 
IV. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 
CONCEPTS AND SOVIET-AMERICAN POLICY 
Mr. Nitze observes that one can read the broader signs 
of Soviet behavior and come to the conclusion that a primary 
"touchstone" of ctitente lies in the area of strategic arms. 
If the Soviets are negotiating in good faith and the promise 
of stable nuclear balance is attainable, then the future of 
detente is strong. On the other hand~ if they are involved 
in detente and arms negotiation a~ a means of gaining the 
advantage, then the future is very foreboding. As pointed out 
by Mr. Nitze and as exhibited by history since the turn of the 
century, the Communists are very serious about their doctrine 
of the eventual world triumph of socialism and are dedicated 0 
to assuring that this goal will become fact. 
Mr. Nitze believes that there is a basic contrast between 
the two powers on some aspects of the prospect of and prepara-
tion for nuclear war. His opinion is that over the last thirty 
years, the U.S. has thought only in terms of deterring nuclear 
war while the Soviets have additionally considered what would 
happen in event of nuclear war. Mr. Nitze contends that the 
Soviets have put much effort and money into a civil defense 
effort to minimize losses. He cites Soviet civil defense manuals 
that estimate that the prescribed civil defense procedures would 
limit casualities to three to four per cent of the total popu-
lation of the U.S.S.R. This fact, if true, reduces the U.S.'s 
ability to "hold" the civilian population of the U.S.S.R. hostage 
and therefore affects the balance or stability of the nuclear 
arms situation. 
Mr. Nitze then moves on to define five s t rategic nuclear 
concepts of deterrence tha t are avai l able to any nat i on which 
has nuclear weapons. These concepts are as follows: 
1. Minimum Deterrence - the capability to destroy a few 
key cities with little counterforce (against military 
targets such as land based missiles) capability. 
2. Massive Urban/Industrial Retalia t ion - capability to 
destroy many cities, many people and much industrial 
capacity on a second strike basis. 
3. Flex i ble Response - where the United States would have 
the capability to react to a Soviet attack without 
using an attack i mmedi ately against Soviet cities. 
4. Denial of Nuclear War Winning Capability to the Other 
Side - even if the other side attacked first, the 





winner so inconclusive that the exchange would be 
equally unattractive for both sides [mutual assured 
destruction]. 
5. A Nuclear War Winning Capability - a position so sup-
erior that regardless of the nature of the exchange, 
one's surviving capability would exceed the opponent's. 
(Note these categories roughly compare with Gray's strategies 
-reference 2- beginning on page 131 of his article.) 
The past policies of the Soviet and the U.S. Governments 
and the past balances can be viewed within the framework of 
these five concepts, according to Nitze. Until 1954, the U.S. 
easily maintained a nuclear superiority. But during the late 
SO's the vulnerability of our bomber bases became a problem 
and a weakness. This vulnerability, plus an emphasis on sur-
vibility of our nuclear striking force, coupled with fear of 
an "inter-continental ballistic missile" (ICBM) gap, brought 
action that allowed the U.S. to regain superiority in 1961-62. 
Up to that point in time, it seems most people in the U.S. 
favored the concept of a war winning capability as the best 
form of deterrence. With the burgeoning efforts and successes 
by the Soviets, the idea became prevalent in the U.S. that 
mutual deterrence would be best accomplished under the objec-
tive of mutually ·assured destruction which would make attack 
undesirable for both sides. 
As the Americans adjusted to this new posture, the Soviets 
were invited to conform in this scheme to assure world stra-
tegic stability. Mr. Nitze reports that the Soviets responded 
rather ambiguously and were either striving for parity with the 
U.S. or were aiming for a nuclear war winning capability. These 
actions may have been influenced by the Soviet's decisions and 
reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Nitze theorizes that 
this aborted attempt by the Russians to change the strategic 
balance by drastic and rapid action may have convinced the 
Soviets that the Power with nuclear superiority will prevail. 
Based on this experience, the Communists may have decided to 
increase efforts in the strategic nuclear area and that what 
Soviet capability we saw appearing in the middle and late 60's, 
and early 70's was the result of this shift in policy. 
Mr. Nitze concluded this section of his article by postu-
lating that there are divisions on the Soviet side as to what 
is the best form of deterrence for them to pursue. There may 
be those who advocate a war winning capability but feel that 
the U.S. is a formidable opponent who would do whatever is nec-
essary to deny such a war winning capability to the Soviets. 
1 
There are supposedly others who feel that the problems of 
democracy and capitalism will restrain the U.S. and its free 
world friends from taking those steps or countermeasures to 
effectively deny the war wi nning capability to the Soviets. 
The only rebuttal or comment on this part of the article 
comes from the Stanford letter which comments on Mr . Nitze's 
categorization of the strategic concepts. The authors of the 
letter accuse Mr. Ni t ze of preferring the nuclear superiority 
or war winning concepts. Further, the Stanford group feels 
that Mr. Nitze's comments on Soviet intentions are not based 
on facts. They contend that there is nothing to support that 
the Soviets "buy" the thesis that nuclear war "can be won". 
To the contrary, the statements made by the Soviets during 0 
the SALT talks as to the "suicidal" nature of nuclear war in-
dicate to the Stanford group that the U.S .S.R. is not bent on 
nuclear war. 
It is not apparent from reading th e Nitze article that 
h e is favoring one concept over another and i t certainly is 
not clear that he is advocating that the U.S. maintain or 
strive for a war winning capability. This idea is further 
supported by the fact that Mr. Nitze participated in the 
decis i on to pursue the "mutal assured destruction concept" 
adopted by the U.S. administration of the Kennedy-Johnson era. 
This concept is far from the nuclear war winning capability 
that the Stanford group contends that Nitze favors . 
V. THE SALT TALKS 
The first SALT talks began in 1969 where the U.S. went 
to the negotiating table to impress the Soviets with the desir-
ability of n uclear arms limitation that would create stability 
in the world . The U.S. theme was one of "essential equiva-
lence" where each side ·did not have to have equal numbers in 
each component but that the overall capability must be roughly 
equivalent. The Soviets came to the table with the idea of O 
"strategic parity" wh ere each side would have equal security, 
taking into effect geographic and ot h er considerations. This 
basically meant that since the U. S.S.R. is surrounded by armed 
allies of the U.S. that the Soviets should be allowed more 
capability or numbers to equalize the balance of threat. 
Despite this basic philosophic difference, the two sides 
were able to reach agreement on anti-ballistic missiles, 
la unchers, radar, and through the Interim Agreement, agreed 
to temporarily freeze the starting of new offensive missile 




Agreement varied widely. The U.S. considered the Interim 
Agreement as an excellent basis for further negotiations while 
the U.S.S.R. considered the agreement to signify that they 
were entitled to always have an advantage in the number of 
missile launchers and capability. 
Mr. Nitze continues with an analysis of the latest SALT 
talks which culminated in the Vladivostok Accord of 1974. The 
Soviets made concessions and agreed to equal numbers for each 
side as originally conceived for the SALT I talks by the U.S. 
("essential equivalence''). The agreement basically limits the 
number of ICBM's, submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) 
and heavy strategic bombers to 2400 for each side. Out of this 
number, only 1320 missile launchers may be multiple, independent, 
targetable, and reentry vehicles (MIRV). Further, air to sur-
face missiles that have a range of greater than 600 kilometers 
and are carried by heavy bombers must be included under the 
agreement of 2400. Two major weapons which are not included 
under the agreement are two bombers that do not fit in the 
category of heavy bomber but can carry missiles with a range 
of greater than 600 kilometers. These two weapons are the 
U.S,'s FB-III and the Soviet's new Backfire bomber. Mr. Nitze 
contends that the Backfire has a gross takeoff weight that is 
three quarters of the B-I and two and one-half times as large 
as an FB-III. Regardless, Mr. Nitze states that some defini-
tional work remains, such as what a heavy bomber is, as well as 
the solution of problems concerning verification of each power's 
capability. Additionally, he agrees with most experts that the 
problem of verification is not a major area since the agreement 
does not cause a real constraint for either side. 
A problem of greater importance, according to Nitze, not 
addressed in the Vladivostok Agreement is the problem of throw-
weight. Throw-weight is generally defined as the measure of 
weight of the effective payload that can be delivered to the 
intended target. Nitze contends that under the Vladivostok 
Agreement the Russians will have an eventual advantage in throw-
weight of two to one over the United States. This overall dif-
ference in throw-weight, says Nitze, will lead to an eventual 
imbalance in strategic capability in the world. The Russians 
are opposed to considering throw-weight limitations in any talks 
and further, they have stated that future negotiations will have 
to consider forward based systems, such as aircraft carriers, 
which points to continuing the debate as to what is "equal cap-
ability". Based on these foreseeable problems, Mr. Nitze holds 
little hope for the future SALT talks if and when they start. 
Lodal took issue with Mr. Nitze's assessment of the 
Vladivostok Agreement particularly in regards to the value of 
the agreement to the U.S. First, Mr. Lodal contends that 
9 
although the agreement may not have a restrictive effect on 
either side presently, it will certainly constrain the Soviet 
future strategic plans. Also, the agreement settled some 
basic issues with each side making significant concessions. 
The Soviets yielded on the U.S. demand that the numerical 
limits be equal for each side. The U.S. yielded on the Soviet 
demand that the combined effect of throw-weight and MIRV's not 
be specifically limited in the agreement. In retrospect, Mr. 
Lodal thinks that this set of compromises may have been un-
fortunate for the U.S. because the equal numbers concept has 
little military strategic value while the combination of large 
missiles and multiple war heads has a significant effect 
strategically. However, Mr. Lodal immediately dismisses this 
"minor" problem by indicating that future improvements in 
accuracy will negate any advantage gained by the Soviets through 
the Vladivostok Agreement. 
Another advantage of the Vladivostok Agreement for the U.S. 
is that since it puts a limit on Soviet future growth of stra-
tegic capability, we can now eliminate "worst" case planning 
in our strategic decisions (i.e., no longer will we have to 
prepare for the worst possible situation concerning numbers of 
enemy strategic weapons since a limit on growth now exists). 
Mr. Lodal agrees that the Backfire bomber could be used 
against the U.S., but does not consider this weapon a signifi-
cant threat, especially without an airborne refueling capability. 
Furthermore, he states that the Soviets "appear willing" to 
make public statements that they will not use this bomber 
against the U.S. 
The Stanford group echoes a point made by Nitze that veri-
fication is not really important under this agreement because 
of the large numbers involved but attempts to solve the veri-
fication problem should be made to preclude the effect of a 
precedent on future SALT talks. Further, they agree that the 
0 
Backfire could be used against the U.S. but the group considers 0 
this matter no more of a problem than the verification matter 
and disposes of it lightly. 
A point about the Vladivostok Agreement that is important 
but was not mentioned by any of the articles or letters, was 
that one of the results of the agreement is that both sides 
agreed that SALT talks will basically be abandoned for the next 
ten years. One might conclude from this fact found in the 
World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook 1975 (ref. 7) (issued 
by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) that 
both sides have grown tired of the disarmament talks and have 
decided to let the times change before continuing the search 
for a permanent treaty. This yearbook further states that a 
10 
good measure of the value of a treaty is whether the fire-
power of both parties has been frozen or reduced. Although 
the final translation has not been completed on the Vladivostok 
Agreement, it appears that this treaty will meet neither of the 
value tests. So the yearbook shares Nitze's opinion that the 
Vladivostok is not a significant agreement for the two parties 
or the world. 
A second point not addressed by any of the sources is 
that although the Backfire may be of concern to us, it would 
seem that the FB-III must create some anxiety for the Soviets. 
Although one could deduce that the Soviets have evaluated the 
trade-offs in this matter and have decided the risk was worth 
0 the benefit, it certainly must concern them. 
0 
Finally, a point in Mr. Lodal's article that seems almost 
incredible is where he states that the Soviets will not use 
the Backfire bomber against us because they say they will not. 
That statement seems too naive for even the casual student of 
history since the turn of the century to accept. 
VI. CHANGE IN THE VIEW OF STRATEGIC PROBLEMS 
Mr. Nitze accurately reflects that Americans in general 
have looked at strategic nuclear problems over the last six 
years in the context of the SALT talks, hoping that maintenance 
of national security would become easier. Now, that hope has 
dimmed he contends that we must view strategic problems the 
way we did before the dawning of the SALT discussions. That is, 
we must decide what strategy is needed and what posture is 
required to support that strategy. Mr. Nitze defines deterrence 
as a political action which attempts to persuade the enemy against 
taking certain actions. On the other hand, military strategy 
is the action commenced should deterrence fail. The objective 
of military action should be to bring a war to an end with the 
least damage. The quality measure of our deterrent ability 
depends on the strength and character of U.S. nuclear policy 
versus those of the Soviet Union. 
As a lead-in to the following points, Mr. Nitze contends 
that the U.S. deterrent capability has been reduced through 
some peripheral actions by the Soviets. He repeats a point made 
previously that by the Soviet's action to improve civil defense 
and their efforts to disperse industrial units throughout Russia, 
they have effectively reduced our nuclear strategic ability 
and have unbalanced the nuclear equation. 
One point of interest found in reading this section and 
later section of Mr. Nitze's article is that although he advo-
cates looking at nuclear problems the way we did prior to the 
SALT talks, he frames his recommendations to fit within the 
latest SALT agreements as he perceives them. 
ll 
VII. POSSIBLE RESULTS OF A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE 
I n an attempt to further evaluate the quality of the deter-
rence of the present U.S. posture, Mr. Nitze postulates what 
would happen if there were a nuclear exchange between the U.S. 
and the U.S.S.R. He selects the scenario for comparison where 
the Soviet side initiates a counterforce strike against the U.S. 
and the U.S . responds with a counterforce strike against the 
Soviet reserve f o rces. He then looks at the remaining capa-
bility on both sides to make his assessment of relative capa-
bility. To make this comparison meaningful, he bases it on 
capability before and after the exchange and measures whether 
there i s a Soviet or U.S. advantage. He applied these tests 
over a period of years from 1964 to 1984 and looks at the 0 
problem from t wo aspects - Soviet - U.S. throw-weight ratios 
and the Soviet - U.S. throw-weight differentials . He makes 
the point that throw-weight is most important in the after 
exchange period since most targets will be "soft" and throw-
weight will be more important than accuracy. 
Based on t h e comparisons discussed above, Mr. Nitze con-
cludes that the U. S. had a clear advantage from 1960 through 
1964. However, the picture began to change then until in 1968 
throw-weights on each side were roughly equivalent with the 
U. S. still retaining the after ex c hange advantage. This re-
lations h ip began to change in 1973 until in 1976, Nitze states 
that the U.S.S.R. could benefit by initiating a counterforce. 
Probably the most foreboding conclusion Mr. Nitze draws from 
his data is that in 1977, the Soviets could initiate a counter-
force strike, stand a counterattack, destroy the Chinese and 
NATO ~orces, then attack t he U.S. population and standard U.S . 
mi l itary targets wit h their remaining nucl e ar capability. After 
1977, t h e Soviet advantage increases rapidly. 
Mr. Lodal takes issue with Nitze's basis of throw-weight 
used for his analysis of capability . By using a sprinkling of 
mathematics, Mr. Lodal attempts to prove that other parameters 0 such as accuracy, are much more important t han throw-weight 
wh en attacking hardened missile sites. Furt her, he contends 
that even if throw-weight is used, this is difficu l t to correctly 
define, especially when such things as bombers ar e included in 
the calculation. Further, he contends that one must consider 
the "range payload" tradeoff whe n discus s ing weapon capability. 
Th at is, throw-weight can be reduced to extend range and thereby 
by decreasing the vulnerability of the launcher as in the case 
of submarine launched ballistic missiles, bu t increasing the 
threat. Finally, Mr. Lodal accuses Mr. Nitz e of overlooking 
the res e rve bombers and submarine forces that would be avail-
able to use in time of a nuclear exchange. Therefore, for these 
reasons, Mr. Lodal concludes that since Nitze's evaluation tech-
nique is based on a faulty basis, h is assessment of the compara-




The Stanford group also points out that throw-weight is a 
far less important indicator of capability than parameters like 
the number of warheads, accuracy and reliability. They state 
that if throw-weight were that important, all we would have to 
do is load our bombers, refit our silos (within the restrictions 
of SALT) and our throw-weight would be increased by a factor of 
four to six. Further, although Nitze and others purport that 
throw-weight is important, there is no apparent pressure from 
Nitze or the Department of Defense to increase the U.S. 's throw-
weight capacity. In conclusion, the group endorses Secretary 
of State Kissinger's repeated efforts to put throw-weight in 
its proper perspective. 
In the Nitze rebuttal to the Lodal article, he makes the 
point that he has looked at the problem using many other indices 
than throw-weight and has found roughly the same result as 
reported in his article using throw-weight. Next he contends 
that Lodal did not understand the basis of his analysis; speci-
fically, Lodal missed the exact scenario that Nitze used. Nitze 
evaluated results after a counterforce exchange where both sides 
were involved and his analysis is done after the exchange had 
taken place. Nitze interpreted much of Lodal's discussion to 
be framed in terms of before an attack by either side or after 
an attack by the Soviets only. As a result, Mr. Nitze dismissed 
much of Mr. Lodal's criticism of the original paper by continual 
reference to Mr. Lodal's confusion on the basis of the scenario 
used. Finally Nitze reaffirms that true stability in the stra-
tegic arena will be maintained only if "parity" is viewed in 
terms of Mr. Nitze's scenario and action is taken to maintain 
that parity once achieved. 
This portion of the basic article and the comments from 
the various critical sources point out the difficulty in asses-
sing what U.S. strategic policy should be. It is certainly 
apparent that in preparing to counteract the Soviets we must 
be able to agree on a valid indicator of threat. Thus this 
is an example of the recurring problem of where the experts 
cannot agree on a measure of assessing quality of threat or 
quality of our deterrent ability and the debate ensues. 
VIII. MR. NITZE'S RECOMMENDATIONS 
Mr. Nitze states, "In sum, the trends in relative military 
strength are such that, unless we move promptly to reverse 
them, the United States is moving towards a posture of mini-
mum deterrence in which we would be conceding to the Soviet 
Union the potential for a military and political victory if 
deterrence failed." To turn this tide, he recommends that we 
(1) take action to improve the survivability and capability 
of our strategic forces; (2) that we take action to reduce the 
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imbalance created by the Soviet civil defense effrot. In the 
civil defense part of his solution, Nitze concedes that in-
creased civil defense efforts are not very politically feasible 
at this time and this probably will not change until the threat 
is greater. He moves on to two more feasible solutions, the 
improvement of accuracy of our present missiles, and the imple-
mentation of a mobile launcher - ICBM program . The improvement 
of accuracy can temporarily offset the throw-weight advantage 
of the Soviets, however, many feel that this is a controversial 
area because of the possible unbalancing effect on the nuclear 
situation by this added threat. Mr. Nitze is of the opinion 
that overall it is apparent that the U.S. must improve accuracy 
to maintain stability and that no unbalancing effect will be 
experienced. 0 
Nitze proposes that in addition to t he decreases in vul-
nerability brought about by the advent of the B-I bomber and 
the Trident submarine, the U.S. should take one additional 
measure to further reduce the vulnerability of its forces. He 
recommends mobile missile launchers be built that could be 
constantly moved from one low cost shelter to another. These 
ICBM's could be employed in sites that could be built on desert 
land presently owned by DOD. Since the U.S.S.R. would never 
know how many or where these missiles were at any one given 
time, they would have to dedicate a large share of their throw-
weight to assure destruction of this portion of our strategic 
forces. 
Finally, Mr. Nitze conc l uded his article by stating that 
the record shows that neither negotiations nor restraint have 
dissuaded Soviet leaders from seeking a war winning nuclear 
capability. So the U.S. must take positive steps to maintain 
strategic stability and a high quality deterrence. 
Mr. Lodal takes great exception to Mr. Nitze's recommen-
dations. First he rejects the movable missile concept as 
••extravagant and untested". Although the idea would increase 0 
the "surviving" U.S. capability, the Soviets might treat these 
missiles as he contends they do the SLBM and not expend great 
amounts of effort in trying to knock them out. Secondly, there 
are many problems, as Mr. Lodal sees it, in implementing this 
Nitze proposal. These problems include the cost and technology 
associated with the movable missi l es advocated. Also, the 
Minuteman vulnerability cited by Nitze and others is only 
theoretical as Lodal sees it, so additional capability may not 
be needed. Finally, the U.S.S.R. has a much better geography 
to accommodate the mobile missi le idea, should they choose 
to follow our lead. 
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Mr. Lodal dispenses the civil defense recommendations by 
questioning the real effectiveness of the Soviet program. He 
contends that although they spend more money on civil defens ·e 
than the U.S., their program may be no more effective than 
ours. Finally, Mr. Lodal states that the only alternative to 
completing the Vladivostok Agreement is to abandon the SALT 
process which would probably fuel the arms race again, an 
eventuality that no one savors. 
The Stanford group also takes issue with Nitze's claim 
that the Soviet civil defense program is so effective. They 
contend that based on the translation of the Soviet civil 
defense plans cited by Nitze, the Soviets are no further 
O advanced than we are. Further, the Soviets certainly shifted 
tradition by agreeing to the ABM treaty and gave up one vital 
link in defense of their cities, so why would they be unbal-
ancing the scale with this endeavor of increased civil 
preparedness. 
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Concerning the mobile IBCM's, the group feels that this 
suggestion is inconsistent with previous U.S. actions when we 
claimed that if the Soviets deployed mobile ICBM's, it would 
be contra to the SALT I agreements. Also, mobile missiles 
would make counting and verification impossible which would 
violate the SALT talks and agreements. 
The two recommendations made by Mr. Nitze appeared to me 
to lack the same forethought that would have probably made 
this part of his article more credible. It is doubtful that 
the American public would ever concede to a comprehensive 
civil defense program that would require as much inconvenience 
as periodic shelter practices, etc. However, in defense of 
Mr. Nitze, even though his critics picked on this point in his 
discussion, it was certainly not the real basis for his recom-
mendations. His mobile missile proposal, the second recommend-
ation, would be much harder to implement than is indicated by 
his discussion of the project. I share Mr. Lodal's observation 
that this proposal would be very costly and may suffer in such 
aspects as reliability and practicability. 
However, one should not let these shortcomings detract 
from the real value of the article. Its value in putting the 
nuclear strategic problem in perspective and in illustrating 
our present relative strategic position with regard to the 
Soviets far outweighs any errors encountered in the last part 
of the paper. If his article does nothing else except stimulate 
others to look at the problem and evaluate the points brought to 
the fore by Nitze, then the article was well worth the effort 
consumed to put it in print and to wage the ensuing debate. 
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Although some may put Nitze in the same catagory as those 
who predicted the 1960 missile gap that never appeared, his 
points bear review and discussion, and his analysis of the 
capabilities of each side deserves testing. We cannot afford 
to disregard opinions such as his for the price, should he be 
right, is too high for the world to pay. The balance of power 
and strategic stability must be maintained lest this planet 
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Because there are less than a dozen privately owned cars 
in the entire country, the traffic cop on duty in Tirana has 
one of the most solitary jobs imaginable as he puts in his 
eight hour shift directing this city's invisible traffic. 
Dressed in a white jacket, white cap, and white gloves, he 
does his job perfectly - considering the absence of cars. 
Spotting an approaching vehicle four to five blocks away, he 
swings into action, making certain that everything is under 
control. As the car approaches, he authoritatively blows his 
whistle, raises his gloved hand, and, believe it or not, 
although there is no other traffic in sight, the auto is made 
to stop. Then, with a dramatic wave of his hand, the lone 
automobile is sent on its way, perhaps to Tirana's single 
O gas station.l 
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Displaying a backwardness unmatched by any other European 
country, and sometimes described as one big, dreary concentra-
tion camp, Albania is the strangest, remotest, and most para-
doxical of all the communist nations. This "Tom Thumb of the 
Adriatic" is the smallest communist country (11,000 square 
miles; population: 2.4 million), but it has the biggest chip 
on its shoulder. Ever since First Secretary Enver Hoxha tossed 
out the Russians, Albania has been a country without a friend 
for thousands of miles from its shores and borders. 
How has this enigma in Eastern Europe come about; what 
forces and events have fashioned this unique nation-state? 
How does this "Land of the Mountain Eagles" differ from the 
other Eastern European countries and what is its future? 
These issues are central to any comparative study of communist 
regimes and it is hoped that this report will shed a modicum 
of light on these questions. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (Pre-Communist) 
In antiquity, the Albanians formed part of the Thraco-
Illyrian and Epriot tribes which lived in the whole peninsula 
from the Danube to the Aegean Sea. In 168 BC, the Kingdom of 
Illyria was conquered by the Romans and remained a Roman 
colony until 395 AD, at which time the Roman Empire was split 
between East and West - Albania becoming part of the Byzantine 
Empire. For the next thousand years, the whole Balkan area 
was the scene of major invasions and battles which gradually 
thinned out the Illyrian population and drove the remainder 
into the mountains . of the Adriatic coast. 
In 1389, the Ottoman Turks occupied the area and through 
their presence and pressure, over two-thirds of the Albanian 
population were converted to Islam. One of the converts, Gjergj 
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Kastrioti, rose to high rank in the Turkish Army and was 
bestowed the title of ''Skander Bey" (Lord Alexander), which, 
in the Albanian language, became Skenderbey or Skanderbeg. 
In 1444, Skanderbeg defected from the Turks and reconverted 
to Christianity. He formed the League of Albanian Princes and 
waged successful resistance against the Turks for twenty-eight 
years. Shortly after Skanderbeg's death in 1468 , the Turks 
reestablished their control, but Skanderbeg was firmly esta-
blished as a national hero for the Albanian people. 
Under the Turkish rule, Albania remained in complete 
isolation and stagnation and, when the Turks were expelled in 
1912 from the Balkans, they left it in about the same condition O 
they had found it. The Albanian highlanders were never fully 
subjected and their tribal organizatiomw e r e l eft intact. 
Thus, they preserved their medieval laws, traditions, and customs. 
As a result, Western civilization and development did not begin 
to penetrate Albania in any meaningfu l way until it became 
independent in 1912.2 
The struggle toward Albanian nationhood really began after 
the Treaty of San Stefano in 1877. Al banian cultural and poli-
tical clubs were formed which agitated for independence and 
in 1908 a group of Albanian intellectuals established a Latin-
based Albanian alphabet, marking a great advance toward Albanian 
unification and statehood. In mid-1912, while Turkey was in-
volved in a war with several Balkan states, a group of Albanian 
patriots proclaimed the country's independence and organized 
a provisional government, which was officially recognized in 
December, 1912, by the London Conference of Ambassadors, al-
though no firm boundaries were declared. 
Finally, after a full year of international discussion, 
boundaries were declared in late 1913, although this arrange-
ment left many Albanians out of the new state, thus explaining 
the current Albanian minorities in present-day Greece and 
Jugoslavia. This new Albanian state, ruled by a German prince 0 
and run according to a constitution provided by an International 
Control Commission, lasted only 8 months. The outbreak of 
World War I in August, 1914, ended Albanian independence and 
for the next four yearsl the country was merely a battleground 
for the warring powers.j 
When World War I ended, numerous European powers attempted 
to dismember the Albanian state. However, through the efforts 
of Presiden t Wilson and an Albanian Partisan Army, independence 
was regained in mid-1920. From 1920 to 1924, there was political 
freedom in Albania although political strife was commonplace, 
due to the confl i ct between the liberals and the old conserva-




However, in June, 1924, the liberals staged a successful 
coup and drove Zogu out of the country and into Yugoslavia. 
The liberal government proved to be too weak and too radical 
and in December, 1924, Zogu led an army out of Yugoslavia, 
toppled the liberal regime, and became ruler of the country. 
In 1928, "President" Zogu proclaimed himself King Zog I and 
ruled as such until 1939. Zog's reign brought political 
stability and a national political consciousness that had been 
unprecedented in Albanian history. Again, however, Albanian 
independence was to be short-lived. In April, 1939, Mussolini 
annexed Albania to Italy and invaded and occupied the country, 
forcing King Zog to flee. Mussolini declared King Victor 
Emmanuel III the King of Albania and imposed a regime in Albania 
similar to his own in Facist Italy. 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMUNIST POWER 
Most of the communist regimes established as a result of 
the Nazi defeat in World War II came into being as a direct 
result of Soviet armed intervention. Following "liberation" 
by the Russian Army, the Soviets were successful in physically 
eradicating serious political opposition and in infiltrating 
the native governments with Soviet agents and/or sympathizers. 
In addition, Stalin managed to personally appoint the communist 
party leaders and, in effect, the heads of state of the 
"liberated" countries. The two Eastern European exceptions, 
however, were Yugoslavia and Albania. Although Yugoslav 
communists received some aid from the USSR, their Albanian 
counter-parts received none. This lack of Soviet influence 
in Albania, from the very beginning, dramatically effected 
the development and world view of the Albanian state. 
At the time of the Italian invasion in 1939, there were 
few communist groups operating in Albania and those that were 
there did not participate in the anti-Facist resistance until 
after the German invasion of the USSR in 1941 . In an effort 
to improve their effectiveness in the resistance, the various 
communist groups met covertly in Tirana in November, 1941, 
and under the guidance of two Yugoslav communists they founded 
the Albanian Communist Party (ACP) and elected Enver Hoxha as 
their leader. 
The two Yugoslav emissaries, Popovic and Mugosa, however, 
directed the party until the end of the war. In order to 
conceal the true Marxist program and orientation of the party 
and to stress nationalism and patriotism, the ACP established 
the National Liberation Movement in September, 1942, as a front 
technique. In July 1943, the Army of National Liberation of 
Albania was created, with Enver Hoxha again at its head. From 
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September 1943 through November 1944, the ACP not only fought 
against the occupying Facist forces, but also attempted to 
neutralize any anti-communist forces within Albania, either 
through persuasion or liq u idatien . This period was truly a 
civil war fought between the ACP and the non-communist native 
forces of the Bella Kombetar and the Legaliteti. During this 
struggle, the ACP killed over 15,000 opponents and imprisoned 
over 50,000 in a civil war quite similar to the Yugoslavian 
struggle between the Communists and the Chetniks.4 
At the Council of Berat, convened by the ACP in October 
1944, a provisional government was declared and in the follow-
ing month, on 28 November, this provisional government installed 
itself in Tirana. Albania's future had never been specifically 0 
addressed by the Big Three at Teheran or Yalta and the resultant 
political vacuum left by the German retreat was quickly filled 
by the ACP government. Thus, Albania was the only European 
Communist country that was "liberated" without the actual pre-
sence of Soviet troops and without direct military assistance 
from the Soviet Union. Political direction was supplied by 
the emissaries of the Yugoslav communis t party and the Anglo-
American command in Italy supplied most of the war materials 
used by the Albanian partisan forces. 
After spending the better part of a year consolidating 
their power and influence, the ACP held elections in December 
1945. Although the ACP represented only four or five percent 
of the Albanian population, the "front" organization received 
93.2 percent of the votes. After declaring the People's 
Republic of Albania on 11 January 1946, the ACP purged all 
non-front members from the Constituent Assembly, executing 
most of them as "enemies of the people 11 .6 
THE YUGOSLAVIA SATELLITE: 1944-1948 
Yugoslav influence within the Albanian Communist Party 
had been great since its founding in 1941, and a definite pro-
Tito faction existed within the ACP, led primarily by Koci 
Xoxe, the Albanian Minister of the Interior. The first Albanian 
Constitution, adopted in March, 1946, was based largely on the 
Yugoslav Communist Constitution and as soon as the Hoxha regime 
was firmly established in Tirana, Tito began to attempt to 
dominate the ACP and make Albania a satellite of his state. 
Tito saw Albania as.a source of raw materials and sought, 
through trade, monetary, and customs union arrangements, to 
reduce Albania to an appendage of the Yugoslav economy. Early 
in 1944 and again in 1947, Tito attempted to unseat Hoxha and 
replace him with a more pro-Tito leader; both attempts , however, 
failed. These activities engendered much resentme nt within 
the ACP leadership, but Koci Xoxe kept these host i lities in 
check by purging some pro-Tito members from the Party . 
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In 1947, Tito became concerned about Hoxha's visit to 
Moscow and began to isolate Albania politically, economically, 
and militarily from the USSR. Yugoslav interference in Albanian 
affairs reached a high point in early 1948. Koci Xoxe succeeded 
in eliminating two pro-Hoxha members from the ACP leadership, 
Shehu and Belishova. Xoxe removed Shehu since Shehu was opposed 
to the integration of the Yugoslav and Albanian armed forces 
and the stationing of two Yugoslav divisions on Albanian soil. 
Evidence also indicates that Xoxe was preparing to physically 
liquidate Hoxha and his key supporters, with Tito's assistance. 
Meanwhile, Tito was preparing two Yugoslav divisions for 
transfer to Albania, supposedly to head off a Greek invasion 
of the country. The Albanians reacted strongly to these moves, 
claiming that Tito was attempting to merge Albania with 
Yugoslavia. Relations deteriorated rapidly during 1948 and 
in June, the Cominform expelled Yugoslavia, thus giving Hoxha 
an opportunity to act. All Yugoslav experts and advisors were 
immediately expelled from the country and Albania denounced 
most of the bilateral economic, political, and military agree-
ments they had previously had with Tito's government. Mehemet 
Shehu was rehabilitated and Xoxe was arrested as a "Titoist" 
and subsequently tried and executed. With the threat from 
Tito now eliminated, Albania turned quickly to the USSR for 
support and assistance.7 
THE PERIOD OF SOVIET INFLUENCE: 1948-1961 
The period of dir e ct Soviet influence in Albania began 
in September, 1948, when the first j o int economic agreement 
was signed. Subsequently, other Soviet bloc countries also 
began to extend economic aid. One significant point, however, 
is that Stalin never succeeded in getting Albania to sign a 
"mutual assistance" pa ct - a tactic Stalin had used in every 
other European Communist coun t ry. 
In an attempt to further "de-Yugoslavize" their nation, 
the Albanians rew orked their Constitution of 1946 and adopted 
a new one, on the Soviet model, in July 1950, thus establishing 
a Soviet-style relationship betwe e n the Party and the government. 
Albanian/Soviet rela t i ons betwe en 1948 and 1955 were warm and 
cordial, as were Albanian relations with the other Eastern 
European CMEA states. Due to the underdeveloped nature of the 
Albanian economy, a .massive aid pr o gram was initiated to bring 
Hoxha's country into the Twentieth Century. Although specific 
aid figures have never been published, there is strong evidence 
indicating Soviet-bloc assistance totaling 1.8 billion dollars 
in credits alone during this period. The Soviets also supplied 
over 90% of the technical equipment for Albania's oil industry, 
65% of the agricultural machinery, and 82% of Albania's tractors.a 
Additionally, the Soviets provided over soi of the Albanian 
financial requirements, both on the domestic and international 
scene.9 Needless to say, this close contact with the USSR 
resulted in the structuring of Albania's industry and agricul-
ture along the Soviet model - central planning and collecti-
vization. Finally, in May 1955, Albania joined with the other 
Eastern European nations in aligning herself with Moscow within 
the Warsaw Pact. 
The death of Stalin in 1953 and the subsequent power 
strugg l e within the Kremlin, however, were to bring about 
drastic changes in Soviet/Albanian relations. This paper is 
far too limited in scope and length to deal in detail with 
this issue, but it would be well to mention at least the 
major events and actions that led gradually to the Soviet/ 
Albanian split in 1961: 
(1) In May 1955, Khruschev and Bulganin met with Tito 
in Belgrade t o attempt a reproachment with him and began to 
encourage all Soviet satellites to "rehabilitate" their 
Titoists. Hoxha was diametrically opposed to rehabilitating 
Xoxe and continued to portray Xoxe as Public Enemy No. 1. 
(2) At the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow during 
February 1956, Khruschev announced his "de-Stalinization" 
program and began · to encourage a general relaxation of tens i ons 
within the Soviet bloc. Hoxha was strongly opposed to this 
strong criticism of Stalin and felt that any relaxa t ion would 
jeopardize the stability of his regime. 
(3) In May 1956, at the Third Party Congres s in Tirana, 
the pro-Soviet forces in the Albanian government began to 
agitate for some change, in accordance with Moscow's wishes. 
Hoxha again was opposed to these moves. 
(4) The discontent which surfaced in Poland and Hungary 
during 1956 served to convince Hoxha that, indeed, relaxation 
could only lead to instabil i ty . Additionally, Hoxha openly 
accused Tito of fomenting the Hungarian revolt, a move not 
well received in Moscow. 
(5) In February 1957, Hoxha publicly defended Stalin and 
criticized Moscow for its attacks on Stalin' s policies. The 
ideological split was beginning to develop and Albania was 
slowly beginning to shift more toward the policies of the People' s 
Republic of China (PRC). From 1957 through 1960, although Soviet 
aid continued, the ties between Tir a na and Pek ing began to form. 
The Chinese embassy staff was enlarged and translations of Pravda 
were gradually replaced with those from Jen-mi n Jih-pao, the 





(6) The June 1960 Bucharest Conference was called by 
Moscow in order to unify Eastern Europe against the PRC. 
Hoxa refused to attend and instead sent one of his trusted 
lieutenants. The conference failed to publish an anti-PRC 
declaration, but Moscow continued her pressure. 
(7) Also during June 1960, Khruschev commented to the 
Greek Liberal leader, Venizelos, that he would be sympathetic 
to the Greek's desire to give autonomy to North Epirus 
(southern Albania). Needless to say, this comment was not 
well received in Tirana. 
(8) In July 1960, the Soviets delayed badly needed 
grain shipments to Albania which was, at that time, faced with 
famine and in August, the Soviets demanded that Albania support 
Moscow in her disputs with Peking. Hoxha, of course, refused. 
(9) In September, Hoxha purged two pro-Soviet Politburo 
members from the Party and accused the Soviet ambassador of 
attempting to incite the Albanian Army against his leadership 
of the ACP. 
(10) At the Party Congress in Moscow in November 1960, 
the Albanian leadership confronted the Soviets. Hoxha directly 
accused Khruschev of "revisionism", and claimed that Khruschev 
was attempting to destroy the Albanian state. Transcripts 
of these conversations are enlightening and clearly show the 
depth of the Albanian/Soviet split. Hoxha screamed at Khruschev 
and insulted him openly. Finally, refering to his Chinese 
support, Hoxha walked out of the conference shouting: "Don't 
forget, comrades, that we are now more than 802 million strong! 11ll 
(11) After the November conference, the Soviets changed 
their ambassador in Tirana and dangled trade agreements in 
front of Hoxha, but to no avail. At the Party Congress in 
February 1961, Hoxha publicly rejected the USSR and cast his 
lot with the PRC. As a result of this act, the Soviets pulled 
their forces out of Valone and Sasseno Island, and stopped 
training the Albanian Army personnel. Additionally, the 
Soviets attempted to diplomatically and culturally isolate 
Albania. Hoxha responded by expelling all Soviet advisors, 
technicians, and emissaries. Finally, the Soviets, in the 
late summer of 1961, instituted an economic boycott against 
this tiny country, .hoping to force it back into Moscow's fold. 
(12) The split was made official and permanent in October 
1961. Albania was not invited to the Twenty Second Party Congress 
in Moscow, and was bitterly attacked by Khruschev, who basically 
read Albania out of the world Communist movement in a public 
forum . 
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(13} Finally, in December of 1961, Moscow broke state 
relations with Albania, a measure which had never before been 
applied within the socialist camp, even to Tito. Albanian/ 
Soviet hostility persists to this day. 
THE CHINESE CONNECTION 
Once the Tirana/Moscow rift became final, the PRC rallied 
strongly in defense of the isolated Albanian comrades. They 
publicly defended Albania at the 22nd CPSU Congress against 
the Soviet attacks and furnished the Albanians economic aid, 
technical assistance, and large shipments of grain to fill 
the void left after the Soviet departure. The PRC provided 
$123' million to help finance Albania's Third Five-Year Plan 0 
and aided in the construction of 30 major industrial projects. 
In 1965, the PRC again provided over $214 million to finance 
part of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. From 1960 to 1965, 60% 
of Albania's trade was with the PRC and numerous joint Sino/ 
Albanian enterprises were developed.12 
Chinese support was also evident in 1966-68, when Albania 
emulated Peking by staging its own "cultural revolution" aimed 
at consolidating Hoxha's power. The PRC hailed this exercise 
as a great victory over revisionist ideology and the remenants 
of bourgeois and feudal influence. Although Albania's position 
has closely paralleled the PRC's foreign policy, it would be 
a mistake to conclude that Tirana is merely a spokesman for 
China. Albania's responses to international developments 
have been motivated primarily by its own national interests. 
Although Tirana might deny it, the Albanian leadership are 
nationalists first and Communists secona.13 
HOXHA'S POST 1968 REASSESSMENT 
The liberalization moves taken in Czecheslovakia during 
1967 and 1968 had convinced the Albanian leadership that, 
indeed, the revisionists, led by Moscow, were disintegrating 
and that the "anti-Marxist clique in the Kremlin would do 
nothing to halt the process".l~ Tirana sincerely believed 
that the revisionists in Eastern Europe and in Moscow would 
collapse and the Marxist-Leninists would recapture the 
governmental powers. 
The Soviet intervention came as a surprise and forced a 
sudden and drastic reappraisal by Hoxha of the political real-
ities in Europe. Tirana immediately condemned the Soviet 
aggression and charged that the Soviets had transformed the 
Warsaw Pact "from a defense pact against imperialist aggression 
into an aggressive pact against the socialist countries 




"Brezhnev Doctrine", Albania immediately withdrew from the 
Warsaw Pact in September 1968, although she had not actively 
participated in the Pact's operations since 1961. The PRC 
endorsed the Albanian response and pledged assistance in the 
event of a Soviet attack on Albania.16 
The Albanians quickly strengthened their contacts with 
the Chinese military and began domestic preparations in case 
the Soviets did, indeed, launch an offensive against her. But 
these moves were only the beginning of another major shift in 
Albanian policy, reproachment in the Balkans and an opening to 
the West. 
In August 1968, Tirana openly sided with Yugoslavia in 
her condemnation of the Soviet intervention and in April 1969, 
Tirana pledged military assistance to Belgrade, should the 
Soviets invade Yugoslavia. In 1970, Hoxha was explicitly 
proposing improved Albanian/Yugoslav relations and this momen-
tum culminated in the establishment of full diplomatic rela-
tions in February 1971. 
In 1969, relations between Albania and Bulgaria began to 
thaw as the Bulgarian government began to hint at "normalized" 
relations with Tirana. Relations were normalized on the 
"charge'd'affaires" level in 1970 and in May 1971 the two 
countries signed a five-year trade and payment protocol.17 
Hoxha's diplomatic offensive in the Balkans even reached 
out to her traditional enemy, Greece. In January 1970, the 
two nations concluded a trade agreement and in June 1970, 
this economic cooperation was expanded to $1.8 million. 
Finally, in May 1971, Greece and Albania resumed full diplo-
matic relations - Greece dropped her claim to North Epirus.18 
The 1970's saw increased Albanian contact with the West. 
There were Albanian representatives at trade fairs in France, 
Italy, Sweden, Denmark, and Great Britain, and tourists from 
Western Europe and the United States were granted easier access 
to Albania. In addition, Tirana enjoys diplomatic relations 
with Austria, Turkey, Switzerland, Belgium, France, Italy, 
The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. 
What, however, has happened to Sino/Albanian relations 
during this unprecedented thaw? From 1968 through the early 
1970's, the relations with the PRC were strong and cordial, 
but appear to have suffered some as a result of Sino/Soviet 
attempts at detente. As Peking was emerging from international 
isolation, there were fears in Tirana that China would wish 
to apply its limited resources to cultivating new allies in 
the Third World - and it appears that this is the case. There 
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are strong indications that, although the Sino/Albanian 
alliance is still strong, Chinese aid to Tirana is being 
drastically reduced.19 As a result of this, Tirana has 
recently demanded $4.S million in reparations from the West 
Germans - decreased Chinese aid and inflation have impacted 
severely on the Albanian economy and their need of funds is 
critica1.20 In April 1976, the salaries of all white-collar 
workers were cut by up to 25% and fees and royalties for artists 
and writers were cut by 50%. This economic crunch may be the 
motivating factor behind Hoxha's sudden turn to the Western 
nations.2I Finally, with the death of Mao, Hoxha is assurdly 
nervous about the course the new Peking regime will follow, 
both toward Moscow and toward Tirana. 
HOXHA' S FORMULA FOR SUCCESS 
Thirty-six years after being named Secretary of the Albanian 
Communist Party, Enver Hoxha still reigns supreme in Tirana. 
He has witnessed the demise of Stalin, Khruschev, Mao, and a 
remarkably large number of Eastern European communist leaders. 
He is without a doubt the world's most autocratic ruler, yet 
he has the almost total backing of his people. Finally, he 
has managed to shift his alignment from Yugoslavia to Russia, 
from Russia to the PRC, and currently appears to be involved 
in more open relations with the Balkan states and the West -
all this without one critically serious challenge to his leader-
ship. The casual observer tends to throw Albania into the same 
"bucket" as the rest of the Eastern European countries, but a 
closer look at this "Tom Thumb of the Adriatic" reveals many 
differences - differences that have thwarted Soviet domination 
of Albania and have made this small nation of 2.4 million people 
the last outpost of Stalinism in Europe. At least a cursory 
examination of these factors is necessary in any comparative 
study of current communist regimes. 
(1) The communist rise to power in Albania was truly an 
0 
independent national movement which achieved success without 0 
significant Soviet aid and/or assistance. Yugoslavia provided 
much ideological and tactical support and the weapons came 
primarily from the Allied command in Italy. As a result, upon 
achieving power the Hoxha regime owed no debt to Moscow from 
the very beginning. 
(2) Hoxha's conversion to communism did not take place 
in the Soviet Union, nor under its tutelage, and he received 
no training in Moscow, as did many of the other Eastern European 
leaders. His communist education wa s conducted in France and 
was different in nature than the Sovi et variety. As a result, 




(3) Albania's "liberation" was not brought about by the 
Red Army, but rather by the Albanian communists themselves. 
There were no Soviet troops in Albania in the post-war period 
and the Hoxha government, therefore, was not dependent upon 
Soviet arms for support. 
(4) Obviously, Hoxha was not appointed by Stalin, as 
were many Eastern European leaders, and Stalin did not trust 
Hoxha, but due to his popular support within Albania, Stalin 
was hesitant to act against him. 
(5) After successfully purging the pro-Yugoslav Xoxe in 
1948-~9, Hoxha retained full control over the Albania Secret 
Police. With this power, Hoxha has managed to swiftly elimi-
nate those people within and without the Party who opposed 
him or his policies. 
(6) Albania's geographic position dramatically aided 
Hoxha in containing Soviet influence. Unlike most of the con-
quered Eastern European states but like Yugoslavia, Albania 
did not have a contiguous border with the USSR. This limita-
tion upon the Soviets dramatically hindered Moscow's planning 
and options. 
(7) Unlike the Hungarian leader I. Nagy and the Czeche-
slovak leader Dubchek, Hoya did not make the mistake of surroundi.ng 
himself with known opponents. Hoxha appointed only trusted 
friends and/or relatives to all sensitive and important posi-
tions within the Party and the government . More importantly, 
a s M ao and Ti to, be purged all opponents ruthlessly and 
quickly . For this reason, Moscow had severe difficulties 
cultivating and protecting pro-Soviet forces within Albania 
who could, at Moscow's request, summon Soviet assistance for 
the "healthy" forces in Albania. 
(8) Unlike many of the other communist nations, the 
Albanian Communist Party and the government were not immediately 
infiltrated by Soviet agents or KGB members after World War 
II - a key factor in Soviet control of other communist nations. 
(9) Hoxha was successful in resisting the Soviet call 
for "collective leadership" after the death of Stalin. Although 
Hoxha did designate Shehu as Premier, he retained all his other 
powers and remained .the supreme leader in Albania . Again, this 
restricted the Soviet options in dealing with Albania - they 
dealt with Enver Hoxha or no one. 
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(10) As the Soviet/Albanian rift widened, Hoxha, like 
Tito and Mao, showed the Kremlin leadership that he wo uld 
not be intimidated by Soviet threats. He stressed Albanian 
interests above Soviet-directed "socialist unity 0 • His 
adamant stands on the issues and his open disrespect for 
Khruschev frustrated the Soviet leadership and made them act 
conservatively and with caution. 
(11) Hoxha's success in getting the PRC to openly side 
with Albania, including the PRC pledge of military assistance 
should Moscow elect military intervention, severely blunted 
the Soviet attacks. In addition, the PRC was necessary for 
Albanian development after the Soviet pullou t in 1961. Without 
this PRC aid, Albania would have been forced to eventually 0 
knuckle-under to the Soviet demands. 
(12) Meaningful internal dissent in Albania is almost 
nonexistent. The intellectual dissent which one finds both 
in the USSR and in many of the Eastern European countries does 
not exist in Albania for one simple reason - there are few 
intellectuals and few students. For example, the Writers and 
Artist Association has only 400 members an d Albania's only 
universit~ is tightly controlled and has only 5,287 full-time 
students. 2 Dissent among Albanian workers and farmers is 
also meaningless. Imposition of communist rule in Albania 
merely replaced the feudal lords with communists and t he rest 
of the people really perceive little change. The c ountry 
has been so poor for centuries t h at l ow wages, long hou r s, 
repression, control, and sporadic food shortages are simply 
a way of life - if not THE way of life. Finally, Hoxha's 
security forces, t h e Sigurimi, are highly effectiv e and can 
n i p any and all dissent quickly before it poses any threat to 
t he Hoxha regime. 
(13) Like Mao, Hoxha has been a "True Believer" and, as 
such, is much more difficult for the Soviets to h andle. They 
would prefer a bureaucrat to a zealot. 
(14) Finally, Hoxha has convinced the Sovie t s that Albania 
would fight shoul d Moscow attempt a coup or a military inter-
vention. There are strong reports indicating that the Albanians 
took up arms in 19 61 to prevent the Soviets from withdrawing 
some s ubmarines from Valone. Again, in 1968, Hoxha pledged 
Albanian armed resistence should Brehnev extend "socialist 
assistance" to Albania or attempt to invade Yugoslavia. In 
addition, the new draft Constitution re l eased in 1976 explicitly 
prohibits any Alba n ian from accepting th e surrender or occupa-





Yugoslavia and Rumania. 23 This Constitution makes it clear 
that defending the homeland is the supreme honor for all 
Albanians, in addition to being the most important duty. 
The Albanian party newspaper recently wrote: "Experience 
has taught us to be vigilant and prepar.ed: we are dancing 
in the wolf's mouth. 112cr 
THE FUTURE - A QUESTION MARK 
Prediction is always difficult, especially in the area 
of social and political science. Given Albania's current 
problems, outlook, and leadership, however, certain forcasts 
can be made with some limited certainty. 
Without a doubt, Soviet/Albanian relations will continue 
to be hostile and, depending upon the Soviet response to the 
current crisis in Poland, could worsen - should Moscow provide 
military support to the "healthy" forces in Warsaw. 
Relations with Peking will develop in accordance with the 
actions of the post-Mao government and this regime is too 
recently on the scene to assess accurately. Albania certainly 
desires continued PRC economic assistance, but may be forced 
to take a back seat to Peking's Third World ambitions and Sino-
American 11collusion 11 • Sino-Soviet reproachment will be strongly 
opposed by Tirana; unless Hoxha can receive firm Chinese com-
mittments to Albania that would be operative apart from any 
Sino-Soviet cooperation. 
Albania's recent overtures to the West should continue 
to expand. Hoxha's financial and economic position is not 
good and, given the possibility of greatly curtailed aid from 
the PRC, Hoxha will have to turn further and further toward 
the West. He has "burned his bridges" with the Sovietsand 
cannot turn, once again, to Moscow for assistance. For him 
to change course now would be an admission of error so great 
as to call into question the validity and integrity of the 
Albanian party's militant ideology and history. As long as 
Hoxha remains in power, his only options will be the PRC or 
the West. 
Finally, the problem of succession is now apparently 
solved. The new Constitution, announced in 1976, provides 
a set of stern rules by which this small Balkan state can 
survive should the 68-year-old Hoxha meet with death, as pointed 
out earlier. Hoxha and Shehu, however, appear to be in rela-
tively good health and should continue in power for many years 
longer. Due to the lack of Soviet troops in Albania, the suc-
cession problem should be minimal. 
Jl 
In essence, Albania's real problems of the future lie 
in the economic realm. Hoxha will have to find a way to 
solve these problems, wi th or without the aid and assistance 
of the PRC, and at the same ti me do nothing to undermine his 
own personal power and influence . Given Enver Hoxha's 
performance since 1941, one can only assume that he will, 
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"The military technical revolution is constantly 
introducing new things in all areas of military 
affairs, but the final goals of armed conflict 
at sea remain the same: the defeat of the enemy 
and the destruction of his vital forces and material." 
- Admiral of the Fleet Sergei G. Gorshkov, 
in "Navies in War and Peace" 
"American security, like the American economy, 
stands on a foundation of technological super-
iority. We need superiority in defense tech-
nology. First, because the openness of our 
society tells our adversaries what we are plan-
ning in military technology while their secrecy 
forces us to provide for many possibilities. 
Second, in military operations we traditionally 
depend on superior quality to compensate for 
inferior numbers. Third, in order to interpret 
vital but fragmentary technica l intelligence 
information, we must have extensive prior exper-
ience in the area." 
- Dr. Malcolm R. Currie, Di rector Defense 
Research and Engineering, before the House 
Committee on Appropriations, 29 April 1974 
Military technological competition between the United 
States and the Soviet Union dates back to the building of 
the atomic bomb during World War II. Public awareness of 
the intensity of the competition has at times been acute, 
as in the case of the first Sputnik launch in 1957. The 
resultant scare about the adequacy of U.S. scientific and 
engineering education had a major impact on educational 
institutions and programs. 
0 
Technological competition in the military and military- O 
related spheres can involve major commitments of resources. 
President Kennedy's pledge to make the U.S. the first to place 
a man on the moon, for example, not only meant putting the 
aerospace industry on the line, but also affected the direction 
of research and development in a wide variety of disparate 
fields (medicine, food packaging, and clothing, to name just 
a few). At stake was the technological prestige of the country. 
A different dimension to the competition can be seen in 
the various arms limitations agreements and negotiations. 
Here, it has been possible for one side or the other to give 
up numerical superiority in areas where superior technical 
capabilities can provide some measure of compensation. The 
J8 
dynamic nature of military technology has required a con-
tinual reassessment of the position of the West with regard 
to the Soviet Bloc, in order that strategic positions origi-
nally obtained via some technical superiority have not 
become outmoded. 
An important element in the military technological 
explosion has come from advances in the computer industry. 
Computers have impacted on military capabilities in two 
dimensions. First, they have become integral components in 
many military systems. These include not only ''big ticket" 
items such as command, control, and communications, ballistic 
missile systems, and air and ABM defense systems, but also 
0 an increasing number of small systems, made possible by the 
small size, power requirements and cost of minicomputers and 
microprocessors. Secondly, computers have played an important 
role in advancing other areas of military research and develop-
ment by increasing the speed of research calculation, facili-
tating the management and control of programs, and reducing 
the risk involved in system development. 
0 
Because of the importance of computers in the strategic 
balance, they have for many years been considered strategic 
systems, and are thus subject to the export control restric-
tions not only of the U.S. Export Control Office, but also 
of CoCom (Coordinating Committee of the United States, NATO, 
and Japan). Although a few computers have been exported to 
the Soviet Union, the vast majority of computers in use 
there are the products of an indigenous computer industry. 
The nature of the Soviet computer industry is thus an essential 
element in assessing the current and future military balance. 
Computer science in the Soviet Union began at about the 
same time as in the United States. Development in the field 
has, however, been somewhat slower than in the West. Four 
relatively distinct phases in Western computer technology 
have each lasted some five to seven years. In the Soviet Union 
only three generations are evident. The Soviets themselves 
equate these generations to decades, with the first generation 
extending through the 1950's, the second through the 1960 1 s, 
and the third beginning about 1970. However, the Soviet lag 
in the introduction of third generation digital computers has 
enabled them to incorporate certain hardware features in these 
machines which would ordinarily be found only in fourth genera-
tion Western computers. 
As in other Soviet industries, the direction of development 
in the Soviet computer field has been set by the State. General 
direction comes from the current 5-year plan, and is then imple-
mented via subsidiary economic and technical plans. Computer 
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design has fallen to two different types of organizations: the 
independent scientific and research institutes and the design 
bureaus integral to manufacturing plants. The former receive 
their direction from such organizations as the USSR and Republic 
Academies of Science, while the latter fall under the jurisdic-
tion of the Ministry of Instrument Construction, Means of Auto-
mation, and Control Systems and also the Ministry of Radio Industry. 
When a research institute has designed a computer, the 
design is then given to a manufacturing plant to produce. In 
general there is little crossover between the two routes a com-
puter may take to market; that is, a research organization will 
not normally design a computer to be produced by a plant which 
has its own design bureau. In very general terms, those computers 
designed by the research and scientific organizations have been O 
the more technologically advanced, while those designed by plant 
design bureaus have proven to be the most widely used and accepted 
in other sectors of the Soviet economy. 
A history o f the control of the Soviet computer industry 
looks much like the story of a U.S. company which has come to the 
realization that its Automated Data Processing (ADP) organization 
is not measuring up. Through the mid~l960's, there was little 
high-level interest paid to computers per se. Gradually, the 
Soviet Union began to realize the disadvantages which were accuring 
from the growing lag in Soviet computer technology relative to 
the West. The 1971-1975 5-year Plan laid out specific goals and 
tasks for the computer industry and as a result control over the 
direction of the industry has tightened considerably. The industry 
began to change its direction, from an independent course to one 
much more nearly in line with the West. It was recognized that 
" ... the development of computer t echnology in (the USSR) is 
only possible on a basis of decisive changes in the principles 
of development and construction of new electronic computer models." 
As a result, the Soviet Union entered into an agreement with 
Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland to 
design and manufacture a series of program-compatible general 
purpose computers and associated peripherals. The series which 
has resulted is known as the Unified Computer System and is 
generally referred to as the Ryad Series. The program is believed 
to be under the direction of the Ministry of Radio Industry, and 
the Soviet components of the program have been designed and built 
by those manufacturing plants whose second generation machines 
have been the most widely used. This includes the Erevan Elektron 
Factory (builders of.the Razdan and Nairi series of second gener-
ation machines), the Penza SAM Plant (builders of the Ural series), 
and the Minsk Ordzhonikioze Plant ( p roducers of the Minsk series). 
Involvement of the research institutes i n any s ignificant way has 




In the Soviet Union there is little of the type of manu-
facturer support to which computer users in the West are 
accustomed. Computers are delivered by the manufacturer, 
and some assistance in installation is generally provided. 
A standard software package is given the user, which may or 
may not have been given a rigorous check-out. From that 
point on, the user does his own maintenance of hardware and 
software, and develops his own applications packages. 
There is essentially no feedback of problems, improvements, 
and user experience to the designer or manufacturer, and no 
organizations akin to the user groups associated with Western 
manufacturers. Additionally, there is little crosstalk 
between users employing similar or identical computers in 
similar or identical applications. These shortcomings seem 
to have been recognized in recent years, and the management 
of the Ryad series reflects a greatly increased emphasis on 
program compatibility, program exchange, and improved service 
to the user. 
The Ryad series represents such a giant lead forward that 
it deserves a great deal of attention. At present the series 
is built around seven processors. The system components all 
conform to a standard numbering system, each beginning with 
the letters ''ES" (for Unified System) followed by the 4-digit 
device identifier. System are numbered in the lOXX range, 
while the number of the corresponding processor is found by 
addding 1000 to the numerical designator for the system. It 
is very interesting to note that the last two digits of the 
processor model number equate in general to the most closely 
comparable IBM System/360 processor model. 
Each of the six countries involved in the project has 
responsibility for developing at least one processor, with 
there being two different versions of the ES-1020 and 
ES-1030. Countries and their assignments are as follows: 
ES-1010 ............ Hungary 
ES-1020 ............ USSR and Bulgaria 
ES-1021 ............ Czechoslovakia 
ES-1030 ..........•. USSR and Poland 
ES-1040 ............ East Germany 
ES-1050 ..•......... USSR 
ES-1060 •........... USSR 
All systems through the 1050 are available for delivery to 
users. The ES-1060 is not expected for another two years or 
so. 
There are few differences between the Ryad computers and 
IBM 360's, and in fact the Ryad series has been developed to 
be fully program compatible with the 360. Control Data Cor-
poration purc h ased an ES-1040 in 1975. CDC's software service 
bureau was called upon to run a series of tests on the 104 0 . 
OS/MVT and a series of benchmark user programs were loaded 
onto the system with no modification, and they ran perfectly. 
By essentially copying the IBM System/360, the Soviet 
Union has managed to leap into the third generation at rela-
tively low risk. It is interesting to note that in adopting 
the 360 design the Soviets have abandoned some tec h niques 
and trademarks that made t h eir computers unique. For example, 
the s t range (by Western standards) word lengths have disappeared. O 
There is a decreased dependence on paper tape as a n input-output 
media, although the facility is retained on all Ryad series 
computers. The adoption of the 360 design apparently by dictum 
from high levels of the Soviet planning apparatus represents 
a condemnatio n of the Soviet computer industry's ability to 
go its own way. Yet, interestingly, as recently as 1973, t he 
Deputy Chief of the USSR State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN) 
stated tha t the Soviet computer experience should not be judged 
by American standards, and that the Soviets would build compu t ers 
which were unique to their own requirements. 
Figure 1 compares the number of computer installations 
in the U.S. and t h e USSR at two points in time. For the 
United States, the period 1959-1964 represents the hey-day 
of the second gene r ation computers through the introduction 
of the 360. The 1970-1975 period in the Soviet Union represents 
a span of roughly comparable events, ending with the general 
introduction of the Ryad series. From this comparison, it has 
often been suggested that the Soviet computer lag, in terms of 
actual application to data processing, is as much as eleven 
years. This however assumes that Soviet computer requirements 
are numerically equivalent to our own. The emergence of computer 
industry pla nni n g at t h e GOSPLAN/CPSU level has tended not only 
to improve control and direction over the industry, but has also 
made discussio n of the direction the industry will take a matter 
of public record. 
Soviet planning seems headed in the direction of vas t St ate 
networks of li nked computer centers and data bases, remote 
timesharing facilities, and high-speed digital communications. 
In fact, a debate has surfaced over control of multiple-user-
access data bases in future systems . If these plans do in fact 
materialize , the numbers of computers will cease to h ave much 




United States Soviet Union 
1959 ...... 3,810 
1961 ...... 7,550 
1970 ...... 4,500 
1972 ...... 8,000 
1964 ...... 18,200 1975 ...... 15,000(est) 
Figure 1. 
Soviet literature discusses advanced concepts for com-
puter architecture at the level seen in most U.S. publications. 
However, in the U.S. many advanced systems are either on the 
market or at least in the prototype development stage (e.g., 
ILLIAC IV, Texas Instruments ASC, and the Goodyear STARAN IV). 
The Soviet Union on the other hand is not known to have such 
designs as pipeline, array, or associative array processors 
under development. In fact, implementation of Ryad and ASVT 
computers is limited to a single installation basis, with 
computer networks involving distributed data bases in the 
planning stages. Implementation of the network plans discussed 
above is not programmed until the l980's. The only mention 
thus far of virtual memory systems and virtual machines has 
appeared in Soviet discussion of Western hardware, and not 
references to indigenous machines. 
The effective management and use of computer software is 
a skill not yet fully demonstrated by the Soviets. Soviet 
literature discussing the increased control over the industry 
seems to acknowledge this as a serious shortcoming. Growing 
numbers of computer management professionals from the USSR are 
appearing at Western software conferences, and the Soviets and 
their East European allies have made numerous overtures to 
Western firms to obtain training in computer usage, programming, 
and systems analysis. There is, however, a remarkably small 
repertoire of software packages, software systems, and data 
base management tools in the USSR. Soviet data base technology 
is roughly ten years behind the West, and there is very limited 
experience in managing the development of large software systems 
and data bases. 
The Soviet minicomputer experience has been a very limited 
one. A relatively few second generation "minis" have appeared, 
but in this area the slowness of integrated circuit (IC) tech-
nology has held the Soviets back. Several East European manu-
facturers are beginning development and production of minis, 
and this may be an area where the Soviets plan to allow their 
allies to proceed unrestrained. Two second generation Soviet 
minis are of interest from a military point of view. It has 
only been recently that the West has become aware of the 
Elektronika K-100 and K-200. When both were introduced, they 
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were offered with a complete and apparently well-checked out 
software package. This was unusual in itself, but addition-
ally, there was an extraordinarily high level of redundancy 
in the processor. While conclusions must remain speculative, 
they are generally regarded as minis of military origin which 
have subsequently been offered to non-military users. This 
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that they were produced 
by a plant not previously known to be in the computer business. 
In the area of data entry, the Soviets have achieved near 
comparability in the use of unit record equipment. Performance 
characteristics of Soviet card readers, punches, etc. are 
slightly below that available in the U.S., but the difference 
it certainly not material to the military balance. However, 
the Soviets have only just begun to introduce more sophisticated 
data entry devices. Ryad includes a key-to-tape system among 
the devices which can be attached, but there is no evidence 
of key-to-disk, -cartridge, -floppy disk, or similar systems 
in planning. 
If the Soviet plan for large networks of computers is to 
come to pass, it must depend on an extensive communication 
system capable of transmitting data over long distances at 
high data rates and with few errors. That means a dramatic 
improvement in the communication network over the present 
situation. According to the Soviets' own literature, the 
error rate at transmission speeds over 1200 baud can often be 
excessive . There is not known to be any system capable of 
the kinds of data rates available over, for example, the 
Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) network in the U.S. 
0 
The Soviet computer industry a l so has an image problem; the 
success rate has not been very high, and as a result there has 
often been a tendency to overstate successes . There are fre-
quent references in the Soviet press to under-utilization of 
computers. Typical of these is a 1973 report from the Ukraine 
that the average utilization of the more than 800 comp uters O 
there was only about 55% of the available computer hours (hours 
in which the system was available to users). 
One of the ways in which the Soviets have attempted to 
circumvent the computer lag has been by means of imports . 
This has been done in several ways. The most direct mea n s has 
been by direct import. Below are listed recent imports of 











Institute of Contro l Problems 
Institute for High Energy Physics 
0 
0 
COMPUTER NUMBER YEAR DESTINATION 
ICL 4/50 4 1969 Ministry of Merchant Marine 
ICL 4/52 l 1972 Merchant Marine 
Siemens 4004/1501 l 
Siemens 4004/45 l 
CDC 6200 l 1972 Dubna Nuclear Research Institute 
IBM 360/40 l 1972 Moscow Radio and TV factory 
IBM 360/50 l 1972 Soviet Ministry of Chemistry 
IBM 370/145 1 1976 Intourist reservation system 
Additional sales of IBM 370 and of CDC Cyber 70 and Cyber 72 
computers are pending various approvals. The big prizes are 
the Kama River truck plant, the Soviet air traffic control 
network (both to IBM), and the Aeroflot reservation system. 
The Intourist sale was not approved until the system was 
downgraded to a 370/145 from a 370/155. Additionally, the 
export of IBM 3330 disk drives has been a point of contention, 
and no sale has yet involved any of these. 
An additional means of obtaining Western computer tech-
nology has been through the East European allies. In 1971 it 
was estimated that about 700 Western computers had been exported 
to Eastern European nations, of which 450 were American. IBM 
accounted for some 49% of the U.S. computers, most of which 
were in Yugoslavia. In recent years, CDC has made major gains 
in this market, making itself the third member of the IBM-LCL-
CDC triumvirate that dominates the Western share of the market-
place. OII and Honeywell-Bull have also sold many systems in 
these countries, and recently Digital Equipment and Hewlett-
Packard minis have also been selling well. It is generally 
conceded that the Soviets' East European allies serve as a tech-
nology tunnel for computer as well as other sciences . This 
does not necessarily mean transfer and exploitation of whole 
systems, although it is always a possibility. Tranfers of IBM 
equipment to the USSR by Yugoslavia in the 1960 1 s has often been 
rumored but never proven. 
From a strategic point of view, the third means of transfer 
is the most dangerous. That involves the licensing of Soviet 
or allied countries to produce high-precision, high-technology 
components for computers. As mentioned previously, this is 
an area where the Soviets are having great difficulty in catching 
up on their own. Particularly sensitive are integrated circuit 
devices and high-density storage systems. As of late 1973, 
Ferranti had entered into a licensing agreement with Poland to 
produce certain types of integrated circuits, and Applied Mag-
netics of California had supplied two magnetic recording head 
production plants to Poland. 
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Very little is known about Soviet military computers . 
Military applications are discussed in the open press, but 
in very general terms . There are few cases of complai n ts 
about the performance of military computer systems, contrary 
to the Soviet experience in the civilian world. However, 
the Soviet penchant for secrecy is not apt to make such 
problems a matter of public record. It is difficult to 
assess the degree to which the decision of the 24th Congress 
of the CPSU to adopt the IBM design might have been dictated 
by military needs and prior military computer failings. There 
is little likelihood that military comp uter technology has 
advanced at any greater pace than the civilian. It can be 
considered likely, however, that military application of 
similar or identical technology has had a greater measure of O 
success. This is because historically the best talent has 
been devoted to such applications . Additionally, some fairly 
sizeable portion of the work of cybernetics and computer 
research organizations is generally devoted to military or 
quasi-military projects. 
Soviet literature d iscussing military applications of 
compu t ers tends to adopt a standard ploy, by discussing 
Western applications of computers to military uses. This has 
the effect of highlighting and disseminating useful intelligence 
while at the same time promoting and pushing for similar ideas and 
systems which the Soviets may be working on, wi thout concern 
for security breaches. It is a standard Soviet tactic. Parti-
cular items which have attracted attention from Sov i et mi litary 
writers include the IBM 4-pi tactical computer, anti-missile 
applications being developed by Univac and Control Data, use 
o f computers to evaluate reconnaissance and intelligence infor-
mation (particularly raw data, including pattern recognition 
techniques), laser technology for computers, onboard d i gital 
computers for missile systems, and associative structures . 
One writer even discussed the possibility of bionic components. 
There is an impo r tant element of Soviet computer technology 
not yet covered: analog computers. It is i n this area where 
the Soviets have managed to compensate to a great deal for 
their lack of expertise in the digi t al fiel d . The USSR has 
been strong in the analog field for some time, and i s generally 
regarded as on a par with the West in this area. For this 
reason, they have been able to implement many computer applica-
tions with analog devices where their digital technology could 
not provide the necessary performance . This is especially true 
in many military applications; aircraft fligh t control, which 
today in the West is increasingly a digital l y-controlled 
function, is largely made possible by analog device s in Soviet 




types of devices, but Soviet interest in Western digital tech-
nology in such areas suggests an interest in moving away from 
analog computing for many applications. Digital computers are 
known to be employed in the Soviet space program, and the 
IL-38 May ASW aircraft employs an (probably digital) onboard 
computer for tactical purposes. 
It may be concluded that Soviet general purpose digital 
computer design and production is roughly a decade behind 
that of the United States. Production of computer hardware 
suffers from two major weaknesses: a lag in semiconductor 
thin-film technology, and a lack of adequate quality control 
on the assembly line. Software development is farther 
behind the We~t than is hardware, and the duplication of the 
IBM 360 has further accentuated the software problem. There 
is a near total lack of software system management, and little 
crosstalk among software users and developers with similar 
interest. Digital computers have a poor track record in the 
Soviet Union, and this has led to a substitution of analog 
devices in many military applications in order to allow the 
military to keep pace with Western developments. A high rate 
of failure in automation projects, and the consequent loss of 
productivity relative to the West resulted in a high level 
decision to abandon an autonomous approach to computer develop-
ment and to adopt the IBM System/360 design as the basis for 
the next generation of Soviet computers. While it has enabled 
the industry to make a giant leap forward, the implementation 
of State plans for extensive computer systems in the 1980's 
still requires a major development effort in the areas of micro-
electronics, computer software, industrial quality control, 
and data communications. 
The Western technological lead is a significant one, 
which imparts an important element of strategic advantage. 
Yet without the sophistication of the West, the Soviets have 
been able to implement effective military systems using older 
digital and analog systems . The balance between quality 
and quantity is a precarious one, and one would hope that 
Admiral Gorshkov's words are kept in mind as decisions are 
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DEt/$/ON-M~KING IN THE NIIVlll 
OFFICER DISTRIBUTION PROCESS 
by 
Morris C. Foote 
The U.S. Navy has one of the aost highly centralized 
personnel management systems in America. Because of 
this, many and varied conceptions of the .U.itary 
personnel distribution system exists in the minds of 
those people affected by the system. In this article 
the author examines the focal point of this aystea, 
the Bureau of Naval Personnel, to study the key 
figures involved 1n the process of manning the ships, 
aquadrons, and stations of the Navy and joint co11111&nds. 
The processes employed are outlined and some of the 
factors that aust be considered 1n personnel assign-
ment decision-•Idng are discussed. Some of the 
problems involved 1n filling the "needs of the ser-
vice," the needs of the individual, and the desires 
of the individual are also aentioned. 
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I. MILITARY PERSONNEL OVERVIEW 
In examining the Navy's officer personnel management 
system, it is important to have an overview of the entire 
military personnel system, ranging from national security 
objectives to individuals filling billets. 
Title 10, United States Code, provides the statutory basis 
on which projected personnel requirements are related to na-
tional defense strategy in that it provides for the submission 
of an annual report to Congress by the Secretary of Defense in 
which he is to recommend " ••. the active duty end strength for 
each component of the armed forces ... " and includes " .•. justi-
fication for the strength levels recommended and an explanation 
of the relationship between the personnel strength levels re-
commended .•. and the national security policies of the United 
States ... 111 
To mee t t his requirement, the DOD performs force planning, 
a process involving: 
(1) the determination of defense planning criteria 
from the broad policies and objectives set 
forth by the President; 
(2) the development of detailed "threat estimate"; 
(3) the estimation of force levels which are 
required to deter attack by potential enemies; 
and 
(4) the assessment of the adequacy of present and 
pr~jected f~rce levels in light of these re-
quirements . 
0 
Th is annual, indeed on-going, process is interwoven with 
the development of t h e Program Objectives Memoran da and the O 
up-date of the Five-Year Defense Program in consonance with 
force and mission sponsors. Force planning in the Navy is 
a prime responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
for Manpower (OP-01), whose office assists in translating 
national security ob j ectives into naval personnel requirements. 
The requirements refined after Congressional approval of 
authorization and appropriation bills subsequently signed into 
law a re transmitted to cognizant offices in terms of unit acti-
vati on/ deactivation parameters and activity manpower authoriza-
tion reports (OPNAV 1000/14) • 
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II. NAVY PERSONNEL PLANNING 
Equipped with approved end strength levels and MILITARY 
PERSONNEL, NAVY (MPN) appropriation, the Bureau of Naval 
Personnel proceeds to refine and execute officer accession, 
promotion, and release plans. In this regard, the Director, 
Plans Division (PERS 21) and in particular, the Head, Active 
Officer Plans Branch (PERS 211) can be viewed as conductors 
on a train who are able to set limits on the number of pas-
sengers who come aboard, how long they ride, how soon some 
detrain, and indeed, how fast the train moves from station to 
station. 
0 This is done by monitoring continuing strength levels 
and providing the Commander, Navy Recruiting Command with 
quotas for officer accession programs - especially Officer 
Candidate School - including commissioning dates and desig-
nators upon commissioning. Further, officer communities 
represented in PERS-4 are advised as to the quotas available 
for augmentation of reserve officers and the number of officers 
who must be released to inactive duty in order to complete 
C 
the fiscal year at the approved end strength, It should be 
noted that PERS-2 is concerned with numerical constraints, 
not involved in individual assignment cases. 
There are various parochial interests at work in the 
determination of the communities and numbers of officers in 
those communities affected by the limitations imposed. Accord-
ingly, the Chief of Naval Personnel is normally the person 
who approves the establishment of quotas within CNO guidelines 
and objectives. Because of existing Navy priorities and the 
close-to-critical manning situation in the nuclear power com-
munity, other segments of Navy personnel have assumed secondary 
positions regarding funds and manpower limitations. 
Each community representative in PERS-4 makes independent 
inputs into proposed accession plans in order to support fleet 
requirements anticipated in the out-years. These are analyzed 
in PERS-2 before accession plans are determined and approved 
by the Chief of Naval Personnel. External forces are included 
in this process inasmuch as the various URL, RL, and Staff 
Corps sponsors (OP-02, OP-03, OP-05, BUMED, NAVSUPSYSCOM, etc.) 
interact with their representatives in BUPERS in efforts to 
maximize the "health" of their respective communities. 
Now that end strengths, accession plans, and release quotas 
have been established, and given that activity manpower authori-
zations exist for established coIIU{lands, the scene shifts to the 
distribution process. 
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III. OFFICER DISTRIBUTION HIERARCHY 
For this treatise, the relevant functions of the Chief 
of Naval Personnel are: 
1. To plan and provide for the procurement, dis-
tribution, and career motivation of Navy personnel. 
2. To develop and maintain a military manpower and 
personnel managemen t information system for the 
Navy. 
3. Budget, administer, and account for appropriated 
funds for : Regular and Reserve personnel of the o 
Navy, •.. 
4. Provide admin i strative and technical gui dance for 
personnel-related functions performed Navy-wide, 
such as: 
a. Discipline, promotion, separation, assignment 
and career motivation. 
b. Transportation of Navy personnel and dependents . 
c. Plan for and provide recommendations to CNO 
for rank structures to meet Navy ne e ds.3 
Moving down the organization, one finds the Assistant Chief 
of Naval Personnel {ACNP) for Officer Development and Distribution, 
whose mission is: 
1. To distribu t e officer personnel to meet manpower 
allocations reflected in the optimized billet 
structure. (PERS 41, 42, 43, 44). 
2. To formulate plans for officer developmen t with 
skills and capa b ilities which will be r e quire d 
in the future (PERS 40) 
3. To maintain and manage an inventory of officer 
personnel having currently required skil l s and 
capabilities. (PERS 41, 42, 43, 44) 
4. To effect the promotion of officers. (PERS 48) 
5. To formulate policies goveijning the retirement of 
naval personnel. (PERS 48) 




The next down are the warfare specialty, restricted line/ 
staff corps division directors (0-4's) and various other sup-
porting divisions. As a general rule, PERS-41, 42, 43, and 44 
represent individual constituents in the fleet; whereas, PERS-
40, 47, and 48 provide management guidance or internal support 
regarding programs and policies.5 
The ACNP for Officer Development and Distribution, here-
after referred to as PERS-4, is charged with both filling 
authorized officer billets and with developing officer careers 
such that the future inventory of officers will have the re-
quired "tools" to carry out anticipated missions in both the 
macro and micro senses. Accordingly, he is occasionally the 
final decision-maker in issues viewed differently by the place-
ment and assignment side of his organization or by representa-
tives of different officer communities. 
Examining the organization below the division directors -
in this case, in the Surface Distribution Division - we find 
the CDR, LCDR, LT - ENS (including surface-associated LDO's 
and Warrant Officers) assignment sections (PERS-411, 411b, and 
412 respectively) and the Surface Ship Placement Section 
(PERS-413). The Aviation Distribution Division has a similar 
organization distinguishing between assignment and placement 
functions. Assignment is based on aircraft type (jet, helo, 
prop), and placement is grouped by activity type (VA, VP, VS, 
VT, etc., units and aircraft carriers). For strictly nuclear 
power billets, the separation of detail and placement functions 
is less vivid within PERS-42. 
These offices are the major working components of the 
Officer Development and Distribution Division, especially 
for the unrestricted line (URL) officers. For the restricted 
line (RL) and staff corps, most of the intracornmunity assign-
ments are handled by a double-hatted assignment/ placement 
officer; however, for the URL and intercornmunity and general 
RL/Staff billets, the assignment officers (detailers) and 
placement officers are distinct individuals working for separate 
superiors. Their missions are defined as follows: 
Assignment Sections: To assign officers under their cog-
nizance to all authorized billets ashore and afloat in 
accordance with established policies and directives and 
in such a manner as to make the most effective use of the 
officers' special qualifications, and with consideration 
not only for the officers' professional growth, but for 
their personal interest and morale insofar as is compatible 
with the best interest of the service.6 
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Placement Sections: To place officers, Captain and 
junior, in activities under their congnizance in order to 
most effectively utilize these officers in authorized billets 
as indicated in the approved allowance/officer distribution 
plan (ODP) for each activity and to furnish complete informa-
tion to various assignment officers in regard to the current 
and prospective needs of the program in order to facilitate 
such distribution. 7 
Essentially, the assignment officer - more commonly 
known as the detailer - acts as the representative of the 
indivi dual, trying to assign him to the best job possible 
in accordance with his personal preferences consistent with 
his professional qualifications. 
The placement officer, on the other hand, is primarily 
concerned with providing the activities - commands - he 
represents with the best qualified officers available to fill 
the billets authorized. He is also responsible for monitoring 
all correspondence pertaining to officer assignments between 
his activities and the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Thus, there 
exists an interesting interaction of individual needs and 
service needs. 
At this point, we proceed to the forest of manpower 
management to examine the trees that constitute the mechanics 
of detailing and the forces, the constraints, and the operating 
conditions that exist and play major parts in the long and 
short-run process of officer assignment . As our model, we 
will inspect the surface junior off i cer assignment section. 
IV. MECHANICS OF DETAILING - PROCESS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
The Surface Junior Officer Assignment Section has ten 
detailers and two assignment coordinators. Each detailer is 
responsible for 800 to 120 0 officers grouped according to year 
group (normally determined by the fiscal year in which they 
were commissioned) . The assi~nment process for an individual 
actively begins when serving in a duty station which has a 
relief identified. At this point, the cognizant placement 
officer makes the officer available to his detailer for re-
assignment by indicating the month or two-month time frame and 
conditions under which the officer may leave his present command. 
This may be a specific date, i.e . , a decommissioning date, or 
a 3 0-60 day span based on expected reporting date of the relief, 
ship's return from deployment, etc. The placement officer, 
representing the command, will try to provide time for an or-





The detailer then draws the necessary records - fitness 
report file, pertinent correspondence and latest preference 
card, reviews them for completeness and determination of qual-
ifications. He then enters a decision-making process that 
will eventually lead to an assignment. 
The prime concern in the eyes of the detailer is in guiding 
the officer such that he is as competitive as possible for 
promotion to the next higher grade. As promotion to LTJG and 
Lieutenant occurs in most cases while an officer is at or 
just leaving his first duty station, the biggest medium-range 
goal is in preparing an officer for the LCDR Selection Board 
that meets near the end of an officer's eighth or ninth year 
of commissioned service. Since Selection Board deliberations 
are confidential, guidance as to competiveness/non-competitive-
ness determination must be extrapolated from statistics com-
piled on previous Board actions, guaging present trends and 
future community goals and standards. The detailer looks at 
the time period between the end of the officer's present assign-
ment and his expected first due course consideration by the 
LCDR Selection Board and determines the types of jobs he must 
try to get the officer into and the appropriate chronology of 
the jobs. An officer who has not gained his warfare qualifica-
tions during his first tour will probably be nominated for 
another tour afloat to prepare himself more adequately for a 
department head tour later as a means of increasing his com-
petitiveness for promotion to LCDR down the road. 
Other considerations include the officer's personal desires 
based on expressed intentions about a career, homeport, type 
of activity or billet preferred, and money available to move 
the officer, his family and household goods. 
The detailer makes a recommendation as to type of duty -
sea or shore - and passes the officer's fitness report jacket, 
preference card and recommended assignment to the appropriate 
sea or shore coordinator. The coordinators hold all outstanding 
billet requirements for the surface junior officer community as 
provided them by the cognizant placement officers. They are at 
the center of the detailing/placement interaction by having 
billets to fill, yet working on the "people" side of the house. 
The question of billet-fill priorities - weighing one command's 
needs against another - is a big part of the coordinator's role. 
A matrix system exists to prioritize distribution by using 
activity priority and billet priority as follows:8 
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ACTIVITY PRIORITY (based on activity mission code) 
1. Ships, squadrons, and other deploying units. 
2 . Top management, fleet support, overseas and 
afloat staffs. 
3. CONUS shore, training, reserve administration 
and students. 
BILLET PRIORITY (contribution of the billet to the 
accomplishment of the activity mission, i.e. 
"gapability") 
A. Essential (CO, XO, Department Heads) 
B. Very Important (Prime divisions, e.g., CIC 
Officer) 
C. Important (but can assumed by others, e.g., 
Assistant CIC Officer) 
BILLET PRIORITY 
A B C 
1 1 2 3 




But similar billets controlled by different sponsors may have 
dif f erent priorities, mak ing a fi r m objective comparison 
difficult. 
Further, while a coordinator can reasonably accurately 
determine numbers of requirements in the time frame out six 
to twelve months, based on incumbent projecte d rotation dates 
(PRD), he can less accurately determin e the exact billets to 
be filled since commanding officers have much latitude in 
billet assignments for junior off i cers, and bureau records 
0 
may not accurately describe actual billets held. Additionally, 0 
he is constrained in his knowledge of the exact time officers 
will be available to fill his existing requirements since a 
"daisy chain u may exist, invalidating PRD's. Another variable 
in the process is the quality of officer coming available for 
reassignment. He may have sufficient numbers of officers to 
consider for a specific job, but he may not be able to pair 
the job witlf an appropriately qualified officer with acceptable 
performance. Occasionally, a coordinator will seek out from 
detailers qualified candidates and then work to get one avail-
able for reassignment in the proper time frame. This action 
might have to start ten months before the officer is needed at 
the new command. Obviously, time doesn't permit this type of 




It has been said that an officer details himself. With 
the "checks a.nd balances" system that exists between the con-
stituent-oriented detailer and the command-oriented placement 
officer, an officer's record of qualifications and performance 
will be the controlling factor in his acceptability for a 
specific job, given: 
1. He is of the proper rank and designator . 
2. He is available to fill the billet when a relief for 
the incumbent is desired or required . 
3. Funds exist to pay for his PCS move. 
With the vast majority of all officers in a given community 
going to similar initial assignments, it can be said that 
each has an equal chance of becoming CNO. 
Once an officer begins amassing a record of performance, 
he either remains in contention for the top job, or he begins 
to select himself out of contention for that and other positions. 
Returning to the officer being considered by the coordi-
nator for a tentative new assignment; one sees additional 
variables: 
1. What is the prevailing "climate"? Are there more 
people available for reasignment than billets requiring 
people? This is often called a "buyer's market" in 
that placement officers can hold out for that next 
fellow they feel might be just a little bit better. 
2. Are there placement officers "begging" for people 
to fill vacant or newly-established billets because 
manpower cuts have surpassed billet realignment? 
(A "seller's market" and detailer's dream!) 
3. Are fiscal conditions such that cross-country moves 
are VERBOTEN except by special justification and then 
only at the expense of not moving other officers out 
of their old homeports? The coordinators, in viewing 
the broad requirements picture, must make qualitative 
estimates on these often rather subjective parameters. 
Once the coordinator matches a "body" with a billet, the 
appropriate detailer will, if he concurs in the choice, try 
to gain the acceptance of the officer by the cognizant place-
ment officer. The factors considered by the coordinator will 
then be considered by the placement officer with several modi-
• fications. First, professional performance and qualifications 
for the job will be examined. If it's "go" after that, the 
question of timing is asked. Can the new officer be available 
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for enroute training at appropriate class convening dates? 
Can the actual reporting aboard t i me be made to fit the 
requirements of the command and the incumbent? Does the 
placement officer have sufficient O&MN funds to pay for 
required enroute schooling, or must be hold out for an appro-
priately schooled or experienced relief? 
Several of the most basic questions that must be answere d 
are; 11Have I received from OP-0 1 a change to that comman d ' s 
Manpower Authorization that changes or detletes that billet 
in that command? Is the command scheduled to be deactivated 
prior to, or shortly after, the new officer appears?" "Does 
the requisition I gave the coordinator nine months ago still 
accurately reflect the command's needs four months from now?" 0 
With the provision existing for a CO to use his officers as 
he sees fit and to rotate them among diffierent internal 
billets, close liaison between the command and its placement 
officer is imperativ e to responsive personnel management. 
In other words, the numerical relief for the Gunnery 
Officer may find himself assuming the duties of Damage Control 
Assistant upon reporting to his new command. A placement 
officer wh o is kept aware t h rough a Long Range Training and 
Relief Plan (LORTARP) of a CO's view of his officer situation 
can optimize training monies and officer resources. 
Should the placement officer,in the example, "buy" the 
proposed officer, he and the detailer work out timing problems 
and initiate the orders. The officer is then notified of his 
new assignment. 
If the proposal is not accepted, or if the detailer con-
vi nces the coordinator that he should delay making a proposal 
until some "better" jobs appear, the records return to or 
remain with the coordinator until an acceptable proposal is 
made . 
Obviously, the detailer has limitations on how long he 
can search for a new job for his constituent. The overriding 
constraint is one of time. In our model of the Surface Junior 
Officer community, one can readily see that officers cannot 
be allowed to queue on the quarterdeck of their commands after 
having been relieved while their "agent" in Washington awaits 
the "rig h t " job. Such unjustified overlapping of officers 
will come back to haunt the manpower planners as the number 
of transient personnel will exceed agency and department goals 





There are valid reasons for delaying the assignment 
process. When an officer and his detailer have sufficient 
time prior to the relief coming aboard, the urgency of finding 
future employment is reduced and the detailer can scrutinize 
the job market more closely. Additionally, the officer's 
mobility factor might allow the detailer to wait longer for 
an acceptable or optimal assignment. A bachelor with no 
household goods needs much less time to pack up and detach 
for a different location than does a married father of several 
whose wife has just signed a new teaching contract with the 
local school district. The detailer may want to hold out on 
assigning an officer until that officer has the opportunity 
to complete professional qualifications or until he receives 
a fitness report that he expects will show the officer to be 
competitive for the desired assignment. Recall the earlier 
discussion on the officer as his own detailer. In most cases, 
this delay only means that the officer has less notice of 
orders and time to arrange family matters and household goods 
shipment. It does not normally mean that the officer will be 
overtoured at his present command. 
Should the officer's professional development indicate an 
extension at his present command to be in his best interest or 
the best interest of the command, the detailer and present 
placement officer will normally get the commanding officer's 
and the officer's concurrence before extending the individual. 
An example could be the case of an officer who had little ship-
handling experience and wanted to stay aboard for a deployment 
rather than be assigned to a full tour in another afloat 
command. Such an arrangement would have to be cleared early 
to prevent a relief coming aboard without a billet to go to. 
Again, command liaison with placement and constituent liaison 
with the detailer is vital. The final decision will be made 
consistent with the best interests of the ship, the individual, 
other officers involved, and "service needs". Hopefully, they 
are mutually consistent. 
The detailer who has an entire year group in a given 
community to detail and advise is one of the best sources of 
information as to the professional "health" of that group. He 
can judge by the senior year groups what he must aim his people 
toward and how he must advise and assign them. He can collect 
promotion flowpoint information from PERS-48 to obtain basic 
time constraints for accomplishing his tasks. He can monitor 
the results of professional screening boards (LCDR Executive 
Officer Afloat, Proven Subspecialist, etc.,) to help him in 
his counselling and assignment endeavors. He can also glean 
information from PERS-40 and his warfare sponsor as to future 
programs that will affect his constituents. (Example: The 
requirement for qualification as an Engineering Officer of the 
Watch prior to being ordered to command.)9 
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He must also be attuned to the climate in the fleet. Are 
his "troops" happy? Is there general unrest or dissatisfaction 
about career programs, tour lengths, sea-shore rotation? All 
these items play a part in retention/continuation rates and 
must be considered in both the large and small picture when 
executing a centralized personnel management system. 
V. "OUTSIDE" INFLUENCES 
Third party considerations and influences must also be 
reckoned with. Congress puts money in the MPN account to pay 
for Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves. If BUPERS cannot 
show justification for money requested, or exhibits "poor 
management" practices by achieving lower-than-advertised 
average tour lengths, PCS dollars will be harder to obtain 
in the "out-years". 
"Breaking PRD's", or moving an officer more than two months 
before his Projected Rotation Date, or moving him in an earlier 
quarter or fiscal year, will cause aberrations ranging from mild 
to traumatic. Considering the budget, apportionment, reprogram-
ming constraints and parameters that exist, early flexibility 
ex i sts for changing PRD's to reflect revised requirements, but 
once an unplanned move is made, or an officer is rotated earlier 
than his prescribed tour length called for, some degree of audit 
trail exists that can come to roost in next year's budget hear-
ings, or more immediately, in some other officer not being able 
to get the job he wants and needs because the unforeseen and 
unplanned occurred. 
While all the forces that come to bear on the officer 
assignment process have not been discussed, the prime ones 
have. The fact that the process is flexible within dynamic 
constraints if tantamount. Internal an d external factors 
assume variable weights, and no algorithm has been devised 
to successfully convert the process to a totally quantifiable 
objective procedure. 
The concept of "slating", or tentatively assigning a wider 
band of officers due to rotate in a given two to three month 
time frame is an attempt to more carefu l ly and accurately define 
assets and requirements and then match one with the other. 
Computer support is aiding this process, and the overall level 
of efficiency of the process s h ould increase. On the surface 
side of the house, slating is a viable process down to the 
senior lieutenant level, and it should aid in budget decisions 
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